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A new approach to identifying generalized competing risks
models with application to second-price auctions
Tatiana Komarova
London School of Economics and Political Science
This paper proposes an approach to proving nonparametric identification for dis-
tributions of bidders’ values in asymmetric second-price auctions. I consider the
case when bidders have independent private values and the only available data
pertain to the winner’s identity and the transaction price. My proof of identifi-
cation is constructive and is based on establishing the existence and uniqueness
of a solution to the system of nonlinear differential equations that describes rela-
tionships between unknown distribution functions and observable functions. The
proof is conducted in two logical steps. First, I prove the existence and uniqueness
of a local solution. Then I describe a method that extends this local solution to the
whole support.
This paper delivers other interesting results. I demonstrate how this approach
can be applied to obtain identification in auctions with a stochastic number of
bidders. Furthermore, I show that my results can be extended to generalized com-
peting risks models.
Keywords. Second-price auctions, ascending auctions, asymmetric bidders, pri-
vate values, nonparametric identification, competing risks, coherent systems.
JEL classification. C02, C14, C41, C65, D44.
1. Introduction
In auctions, researchers are often interested in learning models’ economic primitives,
particularly the joint distribution of bidders’ values. Because this underlying distribu-
tion is not known a priori, it must be learned from the data. To obtain credible esti-
mation results, a researcher must first study the identification question to determine
whether the distribution of interest is identified or whether there are many distributions
consistent with the data. The importance of this issue has generated many methodolog-
ical papers on identification in auction models. This paper contributes to that literature.
This paper examines the nonparametric identification of the distributions of bid-
ders’ values in asymmetric second-price auctions. The identification analysis cannot be
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conducted without (a) imposing conditions on the joint distribution of bidders’ signals
and (b) specifying what data are available from the auctions’ outcomes. This paper as-
sumes that bidders have private values and that the only available data pertain to the
winner’s identity and the transaction price. Identification in this framework was first
considered in Athey and Haile (2002).
It is well known that in second-price auctions within the private-values framework,
a weakly dominant strategy for bidders entails submitting their true value.1 This paper
considers an equilibrium where bidders employ this strategy. In this case, even though
the submitted bids directly reveal bidders’ values, the joint distribution of these values
cannot be identified nonparametrically because not all the bids are observed. This result
is established in Athey and Haile (2002). The identification of the parameter of interest
requires strengthening the model’s assumptions. This paper shows that in our problem,
it suffices to assume that bidders’ values are independent. There are three main issues to
address in obtaining this result. First, the distribution functions must be identified non-
parametrically so as to avoid incorrect assumptions about their form. Second, there is
a challenge posed by the asymmetry of the bidders participating in the auction. Finally,
given that the transaction price is the value of the second-highest bid, the identification
proof must be based on the second-order statistic.
One of the main contributions of this paper is to provide conditions on the observ-
able data sufficient to guarantee point identification. Namely, I present conditions on
the observables that are sufficient to show that the model can have at most one solu-
tion and, therefore, to ensure the identification of distribution functions. The main suf-
ficient identification condition can be formulated in terms of the observables as well as
in terms of the unobservables. It is interpretable and is weaker than identification con-
ditions usually assumed in auctions.
This paper delivers another important result by presenting conditions on the ob-
servables that are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a solution to the model;
thus, it is always known with certainty whether the model has a solution. Interestingly,
these conditions for existence are a subset of the conditions sufficient to guarantee iden-
tification.
Another contribution of this paper is to prove that when there are only two types of
bidders, identification always holds. This result is generalized for the case when there
are only two types of bidders and the joint distribution of bidders’ values is given by an
Archimedean copula. I obtain a condition on the generating function of a copula that is
sufficient for identification. This condition is satisfied for many classes of Archimedean
copulas.
A methodological contribution of this paper is to suggest a new approach to proving
identification in analyzed auction models. The idea behind this method is to establish
the existence and uniqueness of a solution to a system of nonlinear differential equa-
tions that relate unknown underlying distribution functions to the observable data. This
strategy includes two major steps. First, I show that the system has a unique solution on
a subinterval of the support; this is what I call a local solution. Second, I demonstrate
1See, for example, Vickrey (1961) or Krishna (2002).
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that this local solution can be extended to the whole support. This two-step approach is
constructive and enables us to conduct a thorough qualitative analysis of the identifica-
tion problem.
Furthermore, the techniques developed in this paper allow for generalizations of the
auction setting. Using the case of three bidders, I outline the specifics of proving iden-
tification in second-price auctions in which the set of actual bidders is unknown and
varies exogenously. Komarova (2009) shows that one can relax the support conditions
and permit distributions to have different upper support points as well as holes in the
support.
Within the private-values framework, second-price auctions are equivalent to as-
cending auctions. For proofs of identification in these two types of auctions, when the
data indicate only the winner’s identity and the winning price, researchers have referred
to results in the statistical literature that examines identification in generalized compet-
ing risks models. Athey and Haile (2002) were first to observe that analyzed auctions can
be considered a special case of these models.
In generalized competing risks models, an object that consists of different compo-
nents fails as a result of the cumulative failure of several of its elements, and the only
observed data pertain to the lifetime of the object and the set of components that had
failed before the object’s failure. Though the main identification result for these cases
was obtained by Meilijson (1981), his proofs lack some essential details, most impor-
tantly, conditions on the observables or on the unknowns that guarantee identification.
I show that my method, on the other hand, provides an exhaustive proof of identification
in generalized models. For any of these models, I provide conditions on the observables
and equivalent conditions on the unknowns that guarantee that the model cannot have
more than one solution. I also explain why the existence of a solution cannot be proved
in general and must be assumed. For a special class of generalized competing risks mod-
els, which encompasses our auction models, I present necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for existence.
For a thorough overview of nonparametric identification in auctions, see Athey and
Haile (2002, 2006, 2007) and references therein. These authors obtain numerous non-
parametric identification results for various auctions settings. For the auction frame-
work analyzed in this paper, Athey and Haile (2002) first explain why this framework is a
special case of generalized competing risks models considered in Meilijson (1981), and
then they refer to the Meilijson’s result to obtain identification. Brendstrup and Paarsch
(2006) deal specifically with asymmetric ascending auctions within the independent-
private-values framework, considering both single-unit and multiunit settings. Their
proof of identification repeats the proof by Athey and Haile, but provides a more de-
tailed technical explanation of why the analyzed auction framework is, in fact, a special
case of generalized competing risks models. Brendstrup and Paarsch also suggest some
estimation methods and apply them to analyze fish auctions in Denmark. Banerji and
Meenakshi (2004) and Meenakshi and Banerji (2005) also consider asymmetric ascend-
ing auctions within the independent-private-values framework by examining wheat
markets in India. Similar to Athey and Haile (2002) and Brendstrup and Paarsch (2006),
they cite Meilijson (1981) to obtain identification.
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Another thread of the literature related to this paper applies the techniques of the
theory of differential equations to identification problems. In auctions, examples of such
papers are Campo, Perrigne, and Vuong (2003), Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2009), Le-
brun (1999), and Maskin and Riley (2003). Campo, Perrigne, and Vuong (2003) prove
nonparametric identification for asymmetric first-price auctions with affiliated private
values. Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2009) address the nonparametric identification of
utility functions for bidders in first-price auctions, specifically when the bidders are risk
averse and have private values. Lebrun (1999) analyzes first-price auctions with inde-
pendent private values and characterizes a Bayesian equilibrium as a solution to a sys-
tem of nonlinear differential equations. He refers to standard results in the theory of
differential equations to show that an equilibrium exists and that it is unique when the
valuation distributions have a mass point at the lower support point. Maskin and Riley
(2003) also analyze the uniqueness of an equilibrium in first-price auctions and prove
it under a certain set of assumptions that includes an assumption about the positive
atoms of the valuation distributions at the lower support point.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews second-price auc-
tions, outlines generalized competing risks models, and explains their connection to
auctions. Section 3 states identification results for second-price auctions and considers
identification in more general auction settings. Section 4 describes generalized compet-
ing risks models in detail and provides identification results for these models. Section 5
concludes. Proofs of propositions, lemmas, and theorems are collected in the Appen-
dices.
2. Second-price auctions and generalized competing risks models
In this section, I first review second-price auctions. Next, I describe generalized compet-
ing risks models and show their connection to these auctions.
2.1 Second-price auctions within the private-values framework
A single object is up for sale and d buyers are bidding on it. The set of all bidders is
known. Bids are submitted in sealed envelopes. The highest bidder wins and pays the
value of the second-highest bid; thus, in these auctions, the second-highest bid is the
winning price. Suppose that the bidders have private values and that they are aware of
their value. It is known that in this setting, a weakly dominant strategy for bidders is to
submit their true value—and this is an equilibrium that I consider later. In this paper,
only the winner’s identity and the winning price are observed in the auction outcomes.
It is worth mentioning that within the private-values framework, second-price auc-
tions are equivalent to open ascending auctions. One form of ascending auctions is a
“button auction,” in which bidders hold down a button as the auctioneer raises the price.
When the price gets too high for a bidder, she drops out by releasing the button. The auc-
tion ends when only one bidder remains. This person wins the object and pays the price
at which the auction stopped.
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2.2 Generalized competing risks models
Now I turn to a brief description of generalized competing risks models. Consider a ma-
chine that consists of several elements. A special case of these models is classical com-
peting risks models. The classical models correspond to a situation in which a machine
breaks down as soon as one of its components fails; the data available after the break-
down are the machine’s lifetime and the element that caused the failure. One example
of these models in economics is duration models. Also, the Roy model is isomorphic to
classical competing risks. In the Roy model, a person chooses from a finite set of occu-
pational alternatives to obtain the highest income and the outcomes of the choice (oc-
cupation and income) are observed. In biometrics, the death of an individual because of
a particular disease when that person also faced several other diseases presents a clas-
sical competing risks model, based on a fundamental assumption that a single cause is
behind every death.
Generalized competing risks models relax this assumption and consider cases in
which a machine fails because of the cumulative failure of some of its elements rather
than a single one. A fatal set for the machine is a subset of parts such that the failure of
all the parts in the subset causes the failure of the machine; in other words, it is a set
of the elements that failed before the machine broke down. In this paper, the machine’s
failure provides information only about the fatal set and the machine’s lifetime. More
details about generalized competing risks are given in Section 4.
2.3 Second-price auctions as a special case of generalized competing risks models
Athey and Haile (2002) were among the first investigators to notice the connection be-
tween second-price auctions and generalized competing risks models. To clarify the
connection, I use the equivalence of second-price and ascending auctions within the
private-values paradigm.
Consider a button auction, as described above, with d bidders. Notice that observing
the identity of the winner is equivalent to observing the identities of the bidders who
dropped out. Compare this auction framework to the following generalized competing
risks model. Assume that a machine consists of d elements and works as long as at least
two of its elements are functioning; in other words, the machine breaks once d − 1 of
its elements are dead. The set of these d − 1 elements is fatal. Clearly, the breakdown of
other d − 1 components would also be fatal. A fatal set in this model is an analog of the
set of bidders who dropped out, and the machine’s lifetime is an analog of the winning
price.
3. Identification in second-price auctions
In this section, I formulate identification results and present a mathematical description
of the identification problem. Also, I discuss generalizations of the identification results.
The proofs of the theorems, propositions, and lemmas of this section are collected in
Appendix A.
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3.1 Statement of the identification problem
Denote bidders’ private values as Xi, i = 1     d. Assume that these values are inde-
pendent and their distributions have densities on a common support [t0T ]. This im-
plies that distribution functions of bidders’ values are absolutely continuous functions
and Fi(t0) = 0, i = 1     d. Point t0 is not permitted to be −∞, but it is allowed to have
T = +∞. Also assume that bidders’ values at each auction are independent draws from
the same joint distribution. We aim to learn this distribution from the available data.
Note that in equilibrium, the bids’ joint distribution coincides with the distribution of
the bidders’ private values. Therefore, if all the bids are observed, then the distribution of
values can be clearly identified. If some of the bids are not observed, however, then nei-
ther the joint nor the marginal value distributions can be identified, as shown in Athey
and Haile (2002). Given that our knowledge is often limited to the second-highest bid,
I show that when the only available data pertain to the bid and the winner’s identity, the
marginal distributions of bidders’ values can be identified if these values are indepen-
dent.
Notation Throughout this paper, I use the following notations. A bid submitted by
player i is denoted as bi. Symbol Mtr represents the transpose of matrix M . The distribu-
tion function of Xi is denoted as Fi, i= 1     d. Function Fi is called positive (negative)
if Fi(t) > 0 (Fi(t) < 0) for t > t0. A vector-valued function F = (F1    Fd)tr on [t0T ] is
called positive (negative) if each of its components Fi is a positive (negative) function.
Function F is referred to as strictly increasing if each Fi is strictly increasing on [t0T ].
For simplicity, I first consider the case of three bidders and then generalize the re-
sults to any number of bidders. Because the winner’s identity and the winning price are
observed in an auction’s outcome, then the probability of an event {price ≤ t i wins} is
known for any t ∈ [t0T ] and any i= 123. So, for each bidder i, we observe the following
subdistribution function Gi on [t0T ]:
Gi(t)= Pr(price ≤ t i wins) i= 123
The comma in the definition of Gi stands for “and.”
The identification problem is to determine whether there is only one collection of
private-values distribution functions F1, F2, and F3 that rationalize observable functions
G1,G2, andG3.
Identification results can be obtained under weaker support conditions. For in-
stance, the distributions can be allowed to have different upper support points. Also,
they can be allowed to have holes on (t0T ), which means that Fi can have flat parts on
this interval. It is essential, however, that each Fi is strictly increasing in a small neigh-
borhood of t0. A more detailed discussion of these extensions is given in the remark in
the end of Section A.4.
I do not explicitly consider the case of observable heterogeneity, but all the results
in this paper carry over when analyzed distributions are conditional on auction-specific
observables.
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3.2 Necessary conditions on observables
I start by describing the properties of observable functions Gi that follow from the
model.
I say that the model is not stated correctly if at least one of the following condi-
tions fails to hold: (i) bidders submit their true values; (ii) bidders have independent
private values; (iii) bidders’ values distributions have densities; (iv) bidders’ values are
distributed on [t0T ].
The next proposition indicates necessary conditions on observable functions Gi im-
plied by the model.
Proposition 3.1. If the model is stated correctly, then the following conditions hold.
Necessary conditions (I):
(i) Gi(t0)= 0, i= 123.
(ii) Gi is absolutely continuous on [t0T ], i= 123.
(iii) Gi is strictly increasing on [t0T ], i= 123.
Proof. By assumption, the distributions of private valuesXi have densities on the com-
mon support [t0T ]. This implies, in particular, that players submit bids equal to t0 with
probability 0. Also, t0 is the lower support point for all distributions. These two facts give
condition (i). Condition (ii) follows from the absolute continuity of the distributions of
Xi. Condition (iii) is true because the support of each Xi is the connected interval [t0T ],
without any holes in it. 
Even though these conditions are simple, it is worth indicating them because they
are useful in the proof of identification. As we can see, all the properties of the private-
values distributions, except for the assumption of independence and the boundary con-
ditions Fi(T) = 1, i = 123, are used to establish Proposition 3.1. The independence
assumption, combined with necessary conditions (I), gives the following result.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that the model is stated correctly. Let F be a solution to the
model. Then
lim
t↓t0
F1√
G2G3
G1
(t)= 1 lim
t↓t0
F2√
G1G3
G2
(t)= 1 lim
t↓t0
F3√
G1G2
G3
(t)= 1 (3.1)
Conditions (3.1) are formulated in terms of both observable and unobservable func-
tions. They characterize a solution F to the model only in a neighborhood of t0. To be
more precise, they find the rate of convergence of unknown distribution functions Fi at
t0 in terms of observable functions Gi. These conditions are essential for proving identi-
fication.
The properties of Gi formulated in the next corollary also play an important role in
establishing identification.
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Corollary 3.3. Suppose that themodel is stated correctly.Then the following conditions
hold.
Necessary conditions (II):
lim
t↓t0
G2G3
G1
(t)= 0 lim
t↓t0
G1G3
G2
(t)= 0 lim
t↓t0
G1G2
G3
(t)= 0 (3.2)
The reasoning behind conditions (II) is that no matter how different the underlying
distributions are, bidders’ probabilities of winning do not have considerably different
rates of convergence at t0.
Now that I have presented necessary conditions on observables, I turn to describing
the mathematical model of identification, and explain how necessary conditions (I) and
(II) are employed in the identification proof.
3.3 Mathematical model of the identification problem
Assuming the independence of bidders’ values, functions Gi can be expressed through
Fi as follows. Let bi, i= 123, indicate the submitted bids. Then
G1(t) = Pr
(
max{b2 b3}< b1max{b2 b3} ≤ t
)
= Pr(max{X2X3}<X1max{X2X3} ≤ t)= ∫ t
t0
(F2F3)
′(1− F1)ds
Functions G2 and G3 have similar expressions. Therefore, unknown distribution func-
tions Fi are related to observable functions Gi by means of the system of integral-
differential equations
G1(t)=
∫ t
t0
(F2F3)
′(1− F1)ds
G2(t)=
∫ t
t0
(F1F3)
′(1− F2)ds (3.3)
G3(t)=
∫ t
t0
(F1F2)
′(1− F3)ds
Notice that the left-hand and right-hand sides of the equations in (3.3) are absolutely
continuous functions, allowing us to differentiate them and obtain the following system
of differential equations almost everywhere (a.e.) on [t0T ]:
g1 = (F2F3)′(1− F1)
Main system: g2 = (F1F3)′(1− F2) (DE)
g3 = (F1F2)′(1− F3)
where gi stands for the a.e. derivative of Gi. I refer to system (DE) as the main system.
Distribution functions Fi in this system must satisfy the initial conditions
Initial conditions: Fi(t0)= 0 i= 123 (IC)
Quantitative Economics 4 (2013) Generalized competing risks models 277
I refer to problem (DE)–(IC) as the main problem. The definition below explains the
meaning of a solution to (DE)–(IC).
Definition 3.1. Function F = (F1F2F3)tr is a solution to problem (DE)–(IC) on an
interval [t0 t0 + a], t0 + a ≤ T , if Fi, i = 123, are absolutely continuous on [t0 t0 + a],
satisfy equations (DE) a.e. on [t0 t0 + a], and satisfy (IC).
The system of differential equations (DE) is a convenient tool because identifying
functions Fi is equivalent to proving that problem (DE)–(IC) can have at most one posi-
tive solution F on [t0T ].
While proving uniqueness, the solutions are not restricted to be monotone. There-
fore, if the unique solution recovered from the distributions of bids and winners’ iden-
tities turns out to be nonmonotone, then it could be interpreted as evidence that the
observed distributions of prices and winner’s identities cannot be rationalized by the
equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies in second-price or ascending auctions within
the asymmetric independent private values (IPV) framework.
3.4 Main results
Proving identification does not require establishing the existence of a solution to (DE)–
(IC) and only requires showing that (DE)–(IC) cannot have more than one solution.
However, I start by presenting an existence result, because it gives conditions for the
existence of a solution that are also used to obtain identification.
Theorem 3.4 (Existence of a Solution). Let observable functionsGi satisfy conditions (I)
and (II). Then problem (DE)–(IC) has a positive solution on [t0T ].
Remember that all conditions on Gi required in this theorem are necessary condi-
tions implied by the model. Therefore, conditions (I) and (II) are both necessary and
sufficient conditions for the existence of a solution to the model. In particular, if even
one of the conditions in (I) and (II) fails to hold, we can immediately conclude that the
observable data cannot be rationalized by the equilibrium in weakly dominant strate-
gies in second-price or ascending auctions within the asymmetric IPV framework.
The next theorem describes conditions on Gi that are sufficient to guarantee the
identification of Fi.
Theorem 3.5 (Uniqueness of a Solution). Let observable functionsGi satisfy conditions
(I) and (II), and the following sufficient condition.
Sufficient condition (III): The function(
g1
G1
+ g2
G2
+ g3
G3
)(√
G2G3
G1
+
√
G1G3
G2
+
√
G1G2
G3
)
(3.4)
has a finite Lebesgue integral—that is, belongs to the class L1—in a neighborhood of t0.
Then problem (DE)–(IC) has a unique positive solution on [t0T ].
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The most important element in obtaining sufficient condition (III) is the result of
Proposition 3.2. To acquire a better understanding of this condition, I write it in terms of
distribution functions Fi.
Remark 3.1. Condition (III) is equivalent to the following condition: The function(
F ′1
F1
+ F
′
2
F2
+ F
′
3
F3
)
(F1 + F2 + F3) (3.5)
has a finite Lebesgue integral in a neighborhood of t0.
A detailed explanation of this remark can be found in Section A.1 in Appendix A.
Condition (3.5) is satisfied, for instance, if the ratio of any two distribution functions of
values is bounded from above on (t0T ].2 In particular, this is the case when the densities
of the distributions of values are bounded above and below from zero on [t0 t0 + η] for
a small η> 0.3
Now it is intuitive that the reasoning behind this condition is that the underlying
distribution functions F1, F2, and F3 are not too different around t0 in a certain sense.
For instance, if the underlying distribution functions are F1 = t, F2 = t2, and F3 =
exp(1− 1
t2
) on [01], then the corresponding observable functions Gi do not satisfy con-
dition (III). Figure 1 depicts such Fi. As we can see, around the lower boundary t = 0,
the private value of bidder 3 first-order stochastically dominates the private values of
bidders 1 and 2. Also, the third bidder’s value distribution has a mass at 0 that is consid-
erably smaller than the mass put at 0 by the value distributions for bidders 1 and 2. This
means that bidders 1 and 2 win very rarely when the observed sale price is close to 0.
Figure 1. Underlying distribution functions.
2If for any i and j, FiFj ≤M on (t0T ], then the function in (3.5), which can be written as
∑3
i=1
∑3
j=1
Fi
Fj
F ′j ,
is bounded from above by M
∑3
j=1 F ′j on (t0T ]. This implies that the function in (3.5) has a finite Lebesgue
integral in a neighborhood of t0.
3If for any i, 0 < M1 ≤ F ′i ≤ M2 < ∞ on [t0 t0 + η], then for any i and j, F ′i ≤ M2M1 F ′j on [t0 t0 + η] and,
hence, Fi ≤ M2M1 Fj on [t0 t0 +η], which implies that
Fi
Fj
≤ M2M1 on (t0 t0 +η]. Clearly,
Fi
Fj
is also bounded from
above on (t0 +ηT ] since Fi(t0 +η) > 0, i= 123.
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Figure 2. Function in (3.5) has an infinite Lebesgue integral in a neighborhood of 0.
Figure 2 shows the function in (3.5). The Lebesgue integral of this function in any small
neighborhood of 0 is infinite due to the terms∫ ε
0
F ′3
F3
(F1 + F2)=
∫ ε
0
2
t3
(
t + t2)= ∞
for an arbitrary ε > 0. Thus, condition (III) is not satisfied. This sufficient condition cap-
tures the fact that the behavior of F3 at t = 0 is unlikely to be identified because the bids
from bidder 3 are almost never observed in a small neighborhood of 0. It also captures
the fact that F1 and F2 are unlikely to be identified around t = 0 because the identities of
bidders 1 and 2 are almost never observed there.
Condition (3.5) is satisfied if all Fi behave as power functions around t0:
0< lim
t↓t0
Fi(t)
(t − t0)αi <∞
for some αi > 0, i= 123.
In identification results for the first-price auctions, it is usually assumed that the
densities of all the distributions of the bidders’ values are bounded away from zero and
are finite on the support. For example, these conditions are imposed in Guerre, Perrigne,
and Vuong (2009). Condition (III) is much weaker than these restrictions.
Suppose t0 is not the lower support point of the distributions of private values, but
is a binding reserve price in the intersection of the supports of bidders’ private values.
This reserve price is known and the bidders submit bids only when their private value is
no less than t0. Then (3.3) and (DE) have to be written in terms of truncated distribution
functions
Fi(t)= Fi(t)− Fi(t0)1− Fi(t0)  t ≥ t0 i= 123
and observable functions
Gi(t)= Pr(price ≤ t i wins|all bidders participate) t ≥ t0 i= 123
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assuming that the econometrician observes whether or not the event {all bidders
participate} occurs, and observes the winning price and the winner’s identity when
this event takes place. Functions Fi and Gi satisfy conditions Fi(t0) = 0 and Gi(t0) = 0.
The identification task becomes the task of establishing the uniqueness of (F1F2F3),
t ≥ t0, and all the conditions indicated in this section have to be verified for Fi and Gi,
i= 123. For more details, see Section 3.5.3.
This paper’s identification proof comprises two major steps: establishing the local
identification result and establishing the global identification result.
Namely, I first prove that problem (DE)–(IC) has only one positive solution F in a
small neighborhood of t0; this solution is what I call a local solution. Establishing the
existence and uniqueness of a local solution is the most challenging part of the iden-
tification result because system (DE) has a singularity at t0 due to Fi(t0) = 0, i = 123.
System (DE) can rewritten in a form that has the derivatives of Fi only on the left-hand
side. In that form, the right-hand side is singular when functions Fi take zero values.
The local existence and uniqueness proofs use auxiliary functions H1 = F2F3, H2 =
F1F3, and H3 = F1F2. Because F1 =
√
H2H3
H1
, F2 =
√
H1H3
H1
, and F3 =
√
H1H2
H3
, system (DE)
can be rewritten equivalently in terms of functions Hi. The existence and uniqueness
of a local solution are first established for this new system because it has a convenient
form, even though it does not satisfy usual Cauchy–Lipschitz conditions, in particular,
because of the initial restrictions Hi(t0)= 0. More precisely, the existence of a local solu-
tion cannot be proven by using standard existence theorems in the theory of differential
equations because (a) functions Hi must belong to a specific region defined by inequal-
ities 0 ≤ H2H3H1 < 1, 0 ≤
H1H3
H1
< 1, and 0 ≤ H1H2H3 < 1; (b) the vector (000) of the values of
(H1H2H3) at t0 is not an interior point of this region. Instead, I use the so-called Tonelli
approximation method, which chops an interval around t0 into very small intervals and
then exploits the form of the system for Hi to build special functions on these intervals
step by step. These functions have an important property: when the lengths of the small
intervals go to zero, the sequence of these functions has a subsequence that converges
to a solution. Proving the uniqueness of a local solution is complicated by the fact that
the right-hand side of the system for Hi does not satisfy a standard Lipschitz condition
in Hi due to the initial conditions Hi(t0)= 0, i= 123. I deal with this by establishing a
differential inequality for functions Hi that implies uniqueness. The local existence and
uniqueness results for Hi give the local existence and uniqueness results for Fi.
After proving the existence and the uniqueness of a local solution to (DE)–(IC),
I show that it can be extended to a positive solution on the entire interval [t0T ], and
that such an extension is unique.
To gain intuition, consider Figure 3. The picture on the left shows the local solution F
found on some interval [t0 t0 + c]. The idea of constructing a global solution is to extend
this solution F to the right at least to a small interval (t0 + c t0 + c1], c1 > c, in such a
way that the extended solution solves (DE)–(IC) on [t0 t0 + c1]. The picture on the right
in Figure 3 shows this extended solution. Then this solution is extended even further to
the right and so on. I show that if we continue this process in a certain way, then we will
reach the upper support point T and, thus, find the solution on the whole support. An
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Figure 3. Solution to the main problem on [t0 t0 + c] (left) and extended solution to the main
problem on [t0 t0 + c1] (right).
analogous continuation argument for extending solutions to larger intervals is consid-
ered in Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2009).
It is worth mentioning that in first-price auctions, Lebrun (1999) and Maskin and
Riley (2003) avoid singularities at the lower support point by considering a reserve price
and assuming that the values of underlying distributions at the reserve price are strictly
positive. In this case, their systems of differential equations obey standard Cauchy–
Lipschitz conditions and, thus, uniqueness is obtained in a straightforward way. In the
framework of this paper, singularities remains present even if t0 is a reserve price and
Fi(t0) > 0 for all i. As explained above, this happens because the system of differen-
tial equations has to be written in terms of truncated distributions functions Fi(t)−Fi(t0)1−Fi(t0) ,
which take the value of 0 at t0.
3.5 Extensions
This section discusses identification in (a) auctions with any number of bidders, (b) auc-
tions with any number of bidders, but where there are only two types of bidders, and (c)
auctions with a stochastic number of bidders.
3.5.1 Any number of bidders Here I show how the identification result for auctions with
three bidders can be generalized to auctions with any number of bidders. I state main
results and outline their proofs in Appendix A. The interpretations and intuitiveness of
these results are similar to those in the case of three bidders.
The observable functions are
Gi(t)= Pr(price ≤ t i wins)= Pr
(
max
j =i
bj ≤ tmax
j =i
bj < bi
)
 i= 1     d
Propositions 3.6 and 3.7 below are the analogs of Propositions 3.1 and 3.2. Corollary 3.8
is analogous to Corollary 3.3.
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Proposition 3.6. If the model is stated correctly, then the following conditions hold.
Necessary conditions (Id):
(i) Gi(t0)= 0, i= 1     d.
(ii) Gi are absolutely continuous on [t0T ], i= 1     d.
(iii) Gi are strictly increasing on [t0T ], i= 1     d.
Proposition 3.7. Suppose that the model is stated correctly. Let F be a solution to the
model. Then
lim
t↓t0
Fi(
G1G2 · · ·Gi−1Gi+1 · · ·Gd
Gd−2i
)1/(d−1) (t)= 1 i= 1     d
Corollary 3.8. Suppose that themodel is stated correctly.Then the following conditions
hold.
Necessary conditions (IId):
lim
t↓t0
G1G2 · · ·Gi−1Gi+1 · · ·Gd
Gd−2i
(t)= 0 i= 1     d
The mathematical model of the identification problem is obtained in the following
way. The definition of Gi and the independence of private values yield the following sys-
tem of integral-differential equations that describes relationships between observable
functions Gi and unknown distribution functions Fi:
Gi(t)=
∫ t
t0
(F1 · · ·Fi−1Fi+1 · · ·Fd)′(1− Fi)ds i= 1     d
The differentiation of both sides of these equations gives us a system of differential equa-
tions
gi = (F1 · · ·Fi−1Fi+1 · · ·Fd)′(1− Fi) i= 1     d (3.6)
Functions Fi in this system must satisfy initial conditions
Fi(t0)= 0 i= 1     d (3.7)
Theorem 3.9 below gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a solu-
tion to the model. Theorem 3.10 presents an identification result.
Theorem 3.9 (Existence of a Solution). Let observable functions Gi satisfy conditions
(Id) and (IId). Then problem (3.6)–(3.7) has a positive solution on [t0T ].
Theorem 3.10 (Uniqueness of a Solution). Let observable functions Gi satisfy condi-
tions (Id) and (IId), and the following sufficient condition.
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Sufficient condition (IIId): The function
d∑
i=1
gi
Gi
·
d∑
i=1
(
G1G2 · · ·Gi−1Gi+1 · · ·Gd
Gd−2i
)1/d−1
has a finite Lebesgue integrable in a neighborhood of t0. Then problem (3.6)–(3.7) has a
unique positive solution on [t0T ].
The main identification condition (IIId) has an equivalent form in terms of the prim-
itives of the model:
The function
d∑
i=1
F ′i
Fi
·
d∑
i=1
Fi
has a finite Lebesgue integral in a neighborhood of t0.
3.5.2 Only two types of bidders: Independent values and special cases of dependent values
Suppose that there are only two types of bidders. An econometrician observes the type
of the winner but not the identity. Let d, the total number of bidders, and k, the number
of bidders of type I, be known. Introduce FI and FII as
FI(t)= P(value of type I bidder ≤ t)
FII(t)= P(value of type II bidder ≤ t)
Then for each i, i= 1     d,
Pr(price ≤ t i wins)=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
∫ t
t0
(
Fk−1I F
d−k
II
)′
(1− FI)ds if bidder i is of type I∫ t
t0
(
FkI F
d−k−1
II
)′
(1− FII)ds if bidder i is of type II
The following functions G˜I and G˜II are observed:
G˜I(t)= Pr(price ≤ ta bidder of type I wins)
(3.8)
G˜II(t)= Pr(price ≤ ta bidder of type II wins)
Their relations to unobserved primitives F˜I and F˜II are
G˜I(t)=
d∑
i=1
1(i is of type I)Pr(price ≤ t i wins)
= k
∫ t
t0
(
Fk−1I F
d−k
II
)′
(1− FI)ds
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G˜II(t)=
d∑
i=1
1(i is of type II)Pr( price ≤ t i wins)
= (d − k)
∫ t
t0
(
FkI F
d−k−1
II
)′
(1− FII)ds
Proving the identification of FI and FII is equivalent to proving that the system of differ-
ential equations
G˜′I/k=
(
Fk−1I F
d−k
II
)′
(1− FI)
G˜′II/(d − k)=
(
FkI F
d−k−1
II
)′
(1− FII)
together with the initial conditions
FI(t0)= 0 FII(t0)= 0
does not have more than one positive increasing solution (FIFII)tr.
The following theorem gives conditions on observable functions G˜I and G˜II that are
both necessary and sufficient for the identification of FI and FII. It shows that in a situ-
ation with only two types, there is no need to verify any conditions similar to condition
(IIId).
Theorem 3.11. Suppose d and k are known, and thewinner’s type and thewinning price
are observed in the auction’s outcomes. The following conditions on G˜I and G˜II are neces-
sary and sufficient for the identification of FI and FII:
(i) G˜I(t0)= 0, G˜II(t0)= 0.
(ii) G˜I and G˜II are absolutely continuous on [t0T ].
(iii) G˜I and G˜II are strictly increasing on [t0T ].
The result in Theorem 3.11 can be extended to the case when bidders’ private values
are dependent and their joint distribution is described by an Archimedean copula,
C(u1u2     ud)=ψ−1
(
ψ(u1)+ψ(u2)+ · · · +ψ(ud)
)

where function ψ, the so-called generator, is defined on (01] and
ψ(1)= 0 lim
x→0
ψ(x)= ∞ ψ′(x) < 0 ψ′′(x) > 0
In other words, the joint distribution of bidders’ values has the following representation
through the marginal distribution functions Fi:
F(t1     td)=ψ−1
(
ψ
(
F1(t1)
)+ψ(F2(t2))+ · · · +ψ(Fd(td)))
As above, suppose that there are only two types of bidders and an econometrician
knows the number of bidders of each type. The data pertain to the winning price and
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the winner’s type but not the identity. Then functions G˜I and G˜II, defined as in (3.8), are
observable. The theorem below gives conditions on G˜I, G˜II, and ψ that are sufficient for
the identification of FI and FII. I assume that the generator ψ of the copula function is
known.
Theorem 3.12. Suppose d and k are known, and thewinner’s type and thewinning price
are observed in the auction’s outcomes. If G˜I and G˜II satisfy conditions (i)–(iii) in Theo-
rem 3.11 and the function ψ
′′(x)
(ψ′(x))2 is increasing, then FI and FII are identified.
Archimedean copulas are often used in various applications due to their convenient
form. This theorem can be applied, for instance, to Clayton, Gumbel, Frank, Joe, and Ali–
Mikhail–Haq (AMH) copulas. Identification within the Archimedean family of copulas in
a different auction framework is considered in Brendstrup and Paarsch (2007).
3.5.3 Reserve price Suppose t0 is a binding reserve price in the intersection of the sup-
ports of bidders’ private values.4 A reserve price does not change bidders’ behavior be-
cause it is still a weakly dominant strategy to bid one’s value. Suppose that the reserve
price t0 is known to the bidders, and that a bidder does not submit a bid if her value is
less than t0. I assume that the set of potential bidders is known by an econometrician
and does not change.5 The econometrician observes whether or not the event {all bid-
ders participate} occurs, and observes the winning price and the winner’s identity when
this event takes place. In addition, suppose that in any right-hand side neighborhood of
t0, densities F ′i are positive on sets that have positive Lebesgue measure.
Since only the second-highest bid is known and information about lower bids is not
available, we have to consider the truncated distribution functions
Fi(t)= Fi(t)− Fi(t0)1− Fi(t0)  t ≥ t0 i= 1     d
and observable functions
Gi(t)= Pr(price ≤ t i wins|all bidders participate) t ≥ t0 i= 1     d
The identification task is to prove the uniqueness of (F1    Fd).
4Now bidders can have different lower support points.
5Here are two examples of how the sets of potential bidders were determined in ascending auctions
considered within the IPV framework. Athey, Levin, and Seira (2011) study federal auctions of timberland
in California, in which the United States Forest Service sells logging contracts. They classify the bidders into
two types: small firms that lack manufacturing capacity (“loggers”) and larger firms with manufacturing
capability (“mills”). To construct the number of potential logger bidders, Athey, Levin, and Seira count the
number of distinct logging companies that entered an auction in the same geographic area in the prior
year. They also do a similar count for mills. In fish auctions considered in Brendstrup and Paarsch (2006),
the bidders are resale trade firms. After consulting with the auctioneer and after examining the raw data, the
authors found that a total of seven potential bidders—two major and five minor—existed. Moreover, each
of these bidders attended virtually every auction, so despite the presence of a reserve price, Brendstrup and
Paarsch decided to ignore the issue of endogenous participation.
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Unknown primitives Fi are related to observable functions Gi by means of the sys-
tem of integral-differential equations
Gi(t)=
∫ t
t0
(F1 · · ·Fi−1Fi+1 · · ·Fd)′(1− Fi)ds i= 1     d
for t ≥ t0. The identification of Fi can be proven by applying the methods of Section 3.5.1
to the system of differential equations
G
′
i(t)= (F1 · · ·Fi−1Fi+1 · · ·Fd)′(1− Fi) i= 1     d
considered together with the initial conditions
Fi(t0)= 0 i= 1     d
All the conditions indicated in Section 3 have to be verified for Fi and Gi, i= 123.
If, in addition, an econometrician always observes the set of actual bidders, then the
values of Fi(t0) are identified from the data because
Fi(t0)= P(i does not participate in auction) i= 1     d
The identification of Fi(t) for t ≥ t0 and the identification of Fi(t0) imply that distribu-
tions functions Fi are identified for t ≥ t0.
The main identification condition (III) in Section 3 did not allow the lower tails of
value distributions to behave very differently. When t0 is the reserve price, the behavior
of the distributions in the lower tails does not matter because only the behavior in a
right-hand side neighborhood of t0 is important. In the example in Section 3.4, the value
distributions are F1(t) = t, F2(t) = t2, and F3(t) = exp(1 − 1t2 ), t ∈ [01]. As was shown,
condition (III) is violated when t0 = 0. Suppose t0 is a reserve price that lies in (01). Then
F1(t) = t−t01−t0 , F2(t) =
t2−t20
1−t20
, and F3(t) = exp(1−1/t
2)−exp(1−1/t20 )
1−exp(1−1/t20 )
for t ∈ [t01]. The densities
of the truncated distributions are equal to zero if t ∈ [0 t0). For t ∈ (t01], the densities are
equal to F
′
1(t) = 11−t0 , F
′
2(t) = 2t1−t20 , and F
′
3(t) = (2/t
3)exp(1−1/t2)
1−exp(1−1/t20 )
. Any of these densities is
bounded from above and is bounded away from zero in a right-hand side neighborhood
of t0. Therefore, as follows from the result in footnote 3, condition (III) is satisfied for
Fi(t), i = 123. To give an example of value distributions with different lower support
points, for each i= 123, consider Fi(t)= (t− t0i)αi , αi > 0, with the support [t0i t0i +1].
Suppose that max{t01 t02 t03} < min{t01 t02 t03} + 1 and that the reserve price t0 lies in
(max{t01 t02 t03}min{t01 t02 t03}+1). Then condition (III) is satisfied for Fi(t), i= 123,
because F
′
i(t) = αi (t−t0i)
αi−1
1−(t0−t0i)αi , i = 123, is bounded from above and is bounded away
from zero in a right-hand side neighborhood of t0.
3.5.4 Auctions with exogenous variation in the number of bidders In this section, even
though the set of potential buyers is observable to an econometrician and does not
change, the set of actual participants is unobserved and varies exogenously. Denote the
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set of potential buyers as {1     d}. Formally, the participation is said to be exogenous if
for all A⊆ {1     d} and for all A′ ⊆A,
Pr
(⋂
i∈A′
(Xi ≤ ti)
∣∣∣A)= Pr(⋂
i∈A′
(Xi ≤ ti)
)

where Pr(·|A) stands for the probability conditional on when A is the set of actual par-
ticipants.
Athey and Haile (2002) note that such exogenous variation could arise when poten-
tial bidders face random shocks to the entry cost and these shocks are independent of
bidders’ private values, and bidders make decisions about entry before their values are
realized. In this setting, bidders with favorable shocks enter the auction and then learn
their values. If the seller does not set a reserve price, then all bidders who entered sub-
mit bids equal to their values. This creates exogenous variation in the set of actual par-
ticipants. Another possible cause of exogenous variation is the bidders’ use of mixed
strategies in Bayesian Nash equilibrium in nonselective entry models, in which all the
bidders observe the same constant entry cost and no bidder has private signals at the
entry stage. Exogenous variation can also be created by a seller’s restrictions on partic-
ipation. McAfee and McMillan (1987) discuss the case of government-contract bidding
where bidders are selected from a list of qualified bidders on a rotating basis.
Here I do not aim to present a complete general analysis of identification. Rather,
I want to illustrate how the methods developed in this paper allow us to approach the
identification problem.
Suppose that the number of bidders and their identities are determined by chance
and the process through which bidders are selected is taken to be exogenous, embodied
in the known to the econometrician probabilitiespA,A⊆ {1     d}, whereA is the set of
actual bidders. The distributions of bidders’ private values are assumed to have densities
on a common support [t0T ]. The observed data are the identity of the winner and the
winning price.
To gain some insight while keeping the problem simple, I consider the case of three
buyers.
The analysis below permits situations when some or all probabilities p1, p2, p3 are
strictly positive; that is, auctions with only one bidder as the actual participant may have
positive probability. I suppose that the auction rule for such cases requires that the ob-
ject is sold to the only participant at the price equal to t0 and that the bidders are aware of
this rule. In this case, if a bidder knows that she is the only actual participant, then she
is indifferent about which amount from [t0T ] to bid. I do not make any assumptions
about bidders’ strategies in such situations. This does not affect the identification analy-
sis because auctions with only one bidder are not helpful in identifying the distributions
of bidders’ values.
The only assumption imposed on probabilities pA is the following:
Ifp123 = 0 then all three values p12p13p23 are strictly positive (3.9)
This means that each bidder competes against any other bidder with a positive proba-
bility.
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As before, the observed functions are Gi(t) = Pr(price ≤ t i wins), i = 123. Using
the law of total probability, for t ≥ t0,
G1(t) = Pr
(
price ≤ t1 wins|{1})p1 + Pr(price ≤ t1 wins|{12})p12
+ Pr(price ≤ t1 wins|{13})p13 + Pr(price ≤ t1 wins|{123})p123
= p1 +
∫ t
t0
(
p12F
′
2 +p13F ′3 +p123(F2F3)′
)
(1− F1)ds
because
Pr
(
price ≤ t1 wins|{1})= Pr(price = t01 wins|{1})= 1
Similarly,
G2(t)= p2 +
∫ t
t0
(
p12F
′
1 +p23F ′3 +p123(F1F3)′
)
(1− F2)ds
G3(t)= p3 +
∫ t
t0
(
p13F
′
1 +p23F ′2 +p123(F1F2)′
)
(1− F3)ds
The differentiation of these equations a.e. on [t0T ] yields
g1 =
(
p12F
′
2 +p13F ′3 +p123(F2F3)′
)
(1− F1)
g2 =
(
p12F
′
1 +p23F ′3 +p123(F1F3)′
)
(1− F2) (3.10)
g3 =
(
p13F
′
1 +p23F ′2 +p123(F1F2)′
)
(1− F3)
To prove identification, it has to be shown that system (3.10) with initial conditions
F(t0)= 0 i= 123 (3.11)
does not have more than one positive solution on [t0T ].
My approach is to construct an auxiliary system by introducing new functions
H1 = p12F2 +p13F3 +p123F2F3
H2 = p12F1 +p23F3 +p123F1F3
H3 = p13F1 +p23F2 +p123F1F2
As shown in Section A.7 in Appendix A, assumption (3.9) guarantees that each function
Fi, i= 123, has a unique representation in terms of H. Let qi(H) denote this represen-
tation. Then (3.10) can be written as the system of differential equations
H ′i =
gi
1− qi(H) i= 123
The initial conditions on Hi are
lim
t↓t0
Hi(t)= 0 i= 123
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The existence of a local solution to the auxiliary problem can be proven by applying
techniques from Section A.3. First, I find necessary conditions on Gi. Assuming these
conditions, I use the Tonelli approximations method to prove the local existence of a
solution H to the auxiliary problem. Then I find a solution F to (3.10)–(3.11) from H by
using formulas Fi = qi(H), i= 123. The extension techniques in Section A.4 would be
used to show global identification.
A more detailed identification analysis of these auctions is given in Section A.7 in
Appendix A.
4. Identification in generalized competing risks models
The main purpose of this section is to present conditions on observables sufficient to
guarantee identification in generalized competing risks models.
In Section 2, I gave two examples of these models. First, I explained why we can
consider second-price auctions to be a special case of these models. In the other exam-
ple, I considered widely used classical competing risks models. I now proceed to a more
detailed description of generalized competing risks models. For convenience, I use the
terminology of reliability theory, which refers to these generalized models as coherent
systems.6 Essentially, a coherent system is a system that collapses because several of its
elements fail.
Suppose that a machine with a coherent structure consists of d elements. Denote the
elements’ lifetimes as X1    Xd and denote the machine’s lifetime as Z; the lifetime Z
is a function of X1    Xd . Conveniently, Z can be characterized by fatal sets. As defined
in Section 2, a fatal set is a subset of parts such that the failure of all the parts in the
subset causes the failure of the machine. Even more conveniently, Z can be described by
the collection I1     Im of minimal fatal sets, which are fatal sets that do not encompass
other fatal sets. A machine is “alive” as long as in every Ij , j = 1    m, there is at least
one part that is alive. The lifetime of the machine then can be expressed as
Z = min
j=1m
max
i∈Ij
Xi
The examples below clarify the structure of a coherent system. To guarantee that the
probability of the simultaneous failure of several elements is 0, I suppose that the joint
distribution of X1    Xd has a density. Also, Xi have the same support [t0T ].
Example 4.1. In a classical competing risks model with d risks, the collection of mini-
mal fatal sets is I1 = {1}     Id = {d}, and the machine’s lifetime is
Z =min{X1    Xd}
Clearly, the number of minimal fatal sets coincides with the number of elements. Fur-
thermore, there are no fatal sets other than sets Ii. Take, for instance, set {12}. Although
it is a superset of fatal sets {1} and {2}, it is not fatal itself. Indeed, the death of these
two elements could not cause the machine’s failure, because the death of either of them
would have led to failure earlier.
6The concept of a coherent system was introduced in Barlow and Proschan (1975).
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Example 4.2. Consider a button auction with d bidders who have private values. In this
case, the fatal sets are the sets of bidders who dropped out before the auction ended. The
collection of minimal fatal sets is
Ii = {1     i− 1 i+ 1     d} i= 1     d
Here, element lifetimes Xi are bidders’ private values and the lifetime Z is the winning
price. Notice that the number of minimal fatal sets is the same as the number of bidders
and there are no fatal sets besides Ii.
Example 4.3. Consider a machine with five parts. Let the collection of minimal fa-
tal sets be I1 = {123}, I2 = {124}, I3 = {134}, I4 = {234}, I5 = {135}, and I6 =
{235}. An example of a fatal set that is not a minimal fatal set is {1235}: It causes the
failure of the machine when, for instance, the machine’s elements break in the order of
5, 1, 2, and 3. Set {1234}, on the other hand, is not fatal, because all its three-element
subsets are minimal fatal sets.
For coherent systems, the goal is to learn the marginal distributions of element life-
times Xi from the joint distribution of observed “autopsy” data, which comprise the
machine’s lifetime Z and a diagnostic set D, which is the set of parts that have failed by
time Z and which is revealed during the autopsy. This identification question is raised in
Meilijson (1981). Meilijson claims that under certain restrictions on a coherent system’s
structure, the distributions of the components’ lifetimes are identified if the lifetimes are
independent. To formulate the identification result, he introduces an incidence matrix
constructed in the following way. Given a collection of minimal fatal sets, the coherent
system’s incidence matrix is a matrix M such that M(i j) = 1 if j ∈ Ii and M(i j) = 0
otherwise, i= 1    m, j = 1     d.
For example, in the three-bidder auctions considered in Example 4.2, the incidence
matrix is
M =
⎛⎝0 1 11 0 1
1 1 0
⎞⎠ 
In classical competing risks models, on the other hand, the incidence matrix is the d×d
identity matrix.
The main result of Meilijson (1981) says that if X1X2    Xd are nonatomic, inde-
pendent, and possess the same essential infimum and supremum, and if the rank of M
is d, then the joint distribution of Z and D uniquely determines the distribution of each
Xj , j = 1     d.
The idea behind Meilijson’s proof is (a) to use data only from those cases where
set D is a minimal fatal set and (b) to obtain integral equations that relate the distri-
bution functions of components’ lifetimes to observable functions, and then apply to
them a fixed point theorem for multidimensional functional spaces. Though Meilijson
(1981) made important contributions, including the observation that only the data cor-
responding to minimal fatal sets can be considered and observation of the rank con-
dition on the incidence matrix, the proofs lack some essential details. First, the author
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does not discuss necessary conditions on observable data besides mentioning them as
a prospect for future research. As we have seen in the auction model, such conditions
are crucial for obtaining the existence and uniqueness results. Second, he does not ex-
plore the existence of underlying distributions that rationalize the observables. A pos-
sible reason for this omission is the fact that in the majority of generalized competing
risks models, existence cannot be proved and must be assumed, as I explain below. Nev-
ertheless, I show that existence can be established for a special class of competing risks
models and present conditions on observables that are necessary and sufficient for exis-
tence. Third, Meilijson’s proof does not give conditions on observables that are sufficient
to guarantee the uniqueness of underlying distributions consistent with the data. I pro-
vide these conditions for any generalized competing risks model. Finally, although the
author mentions that the locally identified distribution functions can be extended to the
whole support, he does not present a proof of this result. As in the auction, such a proof
would require the identification result for the case in which all distribution functions
have positive values at the initial point.
I suggest a new approach to identification in generalized competing risks models
that offers a complete transparent proof of the identification result. I assume that the
distributions of the components’ lifetimes have densities, even though Meilijson (1981)
obtains his result under the weaker assumption that the lifetimes’ distributions func-
tions are merely continuous. The idea behind my method is similar to the case of the
auction; namely, I derive a system of nonlinear differential equations that relates the
underlying distribution functions to observable functions, and then examine the exis-
tence and uniqueness issues for this system. I use the incidence matrix and assume the
rank condition as in Meilijson (1981).
Now I turn to stating the main results for generalized competing risks models. An
outline of Meilijson’s method is given in Appendix B.
For every diagnostic set D, there is a corresponding observable function GD:
GD(t)= P(Z ≤ tD—diagnostic set)
Any diagnostic set is a fatal set. For any fatal set, all the minimal fatal sets it contains as
subsets have a nonempty intersection. Because lifetimes Xi are independent,
GD(t)=
∫ t
t0
( ∏
j∈CD
Fj(s)
)′ ∏
j∈Dc
(
1− Fj(s)
) ∏
j∈D\CD
Fj(s)ds (4.1)
where Fj is the distribution function of Xj , CD is the intersection of all minimal fatal sets
contained in D, and Dc = {1     d}\D.
Let Gi be an observable function that corresponds to the minimal fatal set Ii, i =
1    m:
Gi(t)=
∫ t
t0
(∏
j∈Ii
Fj(s)
)′ ∏
j∈Ici
(
1− Fj(s)
)
ds i= 1    m (4.2)
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System (4.2) of integral-differential equations is an analog of system (3.3). The differen-
tiation of the equations in (4.2) yields the system of nonlinear differential equations(∏
j∈Ii
Fj
)′
= gi∏
j∈Ici
(1− Fj)
 i= 1    m (4.3)
I analyze this system together with initial conditions
Fi(t0)= 0 i= 1     d (4.4)
First, I consider the case in which the number of minimal fatal sets coincides with
the number of the machine’s components, that is, m= d. In this instance, M is a square
matrix. Let kij stand for the (i j) element of the inverse matrix M−1.
In Theorem 4.1 below I formulate the existence result for problem (4.3)–(4.4) and de-
scribe conditions on Gi that guarantee it. Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 assume that lifetimes Xi,
i = 1     d, of the components are independent and their distributions have densities
on a common support [t0T ].
Theorem 4.1.7 Letm= d. Let functionsGi satisfy the following conditions:
(i) Gi(t0)= 0, i= 1     d.
(ii) Gi are absolutely continuous on [t0T ], i= 1     d.
(iii) Gi are strictly increasing on [t0T ], i= 1     d.
(iv) limt↓t0
∏d
j=1G
kij
j (t)= 0, i= 1     d.
Then problem (4.3)–(4.4) has a solution F on [t0T ].8
Notice that, from the model, conditions (i)–(iv) in this proposition are necessary on
Gi. Indeed, (i)–(iii) follow directly from the definition of functions Gi. Given that condi-
tions (i)–(iii) hold, condition (iv) can be obtained from (4.3). The interpretation of these
conditions is similar to that of conditions (I) and (II) in the auction model.
An important difference between this case and the auction, however, is that even if
problem (4.3)–(4.4) possesses a solution F and all Fi in this solution have the properties
of distribution functions, the existence of a solution to the model is not guaranteed. In-
deed, to satisfy the model, F must solve equation (4.1) for any diagnostic set D. System
(4.3), however, accounts only for the minimal fatal sets. Therefore, after finding a solu-
tion to (4.3)–(4.4), we have to substitute it into (4.1) to verify that it solves this equation
for any D. Because it is difficult (and perhaps impossible) to find conditions on func-
tions GD under which the model has a solution, it is common in reliability theory to
assume existence. The only situation in which the conditions in Theorem 4.1 guarantee
existence of a solution to the model is when m = d and the only fatal sets in the model
are minimal fatal sets. Notice that this is the case in the auction model analyzed in this
paper.
7The proof of this theorem is available on request.
8I consider only positive solutions.
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The next theorem provides conditions on Gi that are sufficient for the uniqueness of
a solution to (4.3)–(4.4). The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix B.
Theorem 4.2. Letm= d. Suppose that all conditions onGi in Theorem 4.1 are satisfied.
Denote
Γi(t)= gi
∑
l∈Ici
d∑
h=1
|klh|
(∏
j =h
G
lj
j
)
G
klh−1
h 
If for any i= 1     d, function
Γi has a finite Lebesgue integral in a small neighborhood of t0 (4.5)
then problem (4.3)–(4.4) has a unique solution on [t0T ].
Because problem (4.3)–(4.4) has a unique solution, the model cannot have more
than one solution. Therefore, the following corollary holds.
Corollary 4.3. Letm= d. Suppose that all conditions in Theorem 4.2 are satisfied. Then
a solution to the model, if it exists, is unique.
When the number of minimal fatal sets exceeds d, that is, m> d, the existence of a
solution to the model is always assumed. It is easy, however, to indicate conditions on
observable functions that guarantee the uniqueness of a solution to the model when
one exists. Consider any d × d full-rank submatrix of M . Without a loss of generality,
suppose that this submatrix is formed by the first d rows in M . The subsystem of (4.3)
that comprises the differential equations corresponding to the first d rows in M has only
one solution if Gi satisfy the conditions in Theorem 4.2. Consequently, the model has at
most one solution. We can find other sufficient conditions by choosing different subma-
trices of M .
The proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 use the same methods as those of Theorems 3.4
and 3.5. First, the existence and uniqueness of a solution are established locally and then
globally.
5. Conclusion
This paper has provided methodological contributions by presenting a new way to prove
identification in analyzed auction models. This approach, which employs the tech-
niques of the theory of differential equations, is based on establishing the existence and
uniqueness of a solution to the system of nonlinear differential equations that relates
the underlying unknown distribution functions to the observable data. This method is
constructive and provides new insight by looking at identification from a fresh perspec-
tive. Though it allows us to explore identification in more general auction settings, this
approach is not limited to auctions only. As the paper has demonstrated, it can be ap-
plied to prove identification in a wide class of generalized competing risks models.
294 Tatiana Komarova Quantitative Economics 4 (2013)
There are some issues that are worth exploring in future research. One of them would
be to develop procedures for the estimation of the distribution functions of private val-
ues. One possible approach, which is discussed in Komarova (2009), is to use a sieve
method based on the minimization of a certain sample objective function over a cho-
sen sieve space. The identification result guarantees that the uniform probability limit
of the sequence of such objective function has the unique argmin that coincides with
the collection of true underlying value distributions. Such a uniqueness condition is
usually required when proving consistency of extremum estimators. Alternatively, the
Tonelli approach described in this paper can be used to construct the estimates of the
auxiliary functions first and then use them to construct the estimates of the distribution
functions of values. The identification result would guarantee that a sequence of Tonelli
approximations constructed using consistent estimators of observable functions would
converge to the unique solution to (DE)–(IC), that is, converge to the true value distri-
butions. The sieve approach involves an optimization procedure and the choice of sieve
spaces, whereas the Tonelli construction of an estimator involves integration and the
choice of the length of intervals in the step-by-step procedure. Both methods rely on
nonparametric estimators of the subdistribution functions of price that would be ob-
tained from the observed data in a straightforward way. There are other methods that
can be exploited. One method of interesting estimation issues that would come to light
is the effect of irregularities near the boundary of the support on the rates of conver-
gence of estimators in various norms.
Appendix A: Proofs of the results in Section 3
In the Appendix, I use the following notation. The notation L1[τξ] stands for the class
of functions that have finite Lebesgue integrals on [τξ]. The Euclidean norm of vector
x = (x1     xd) is denoted as ‖x‖ and ‖x‖1 stands for the norm of x, ‖x‖1 =
∑d
i=1 |xi|.
The right derivative of function v at point t is
DRv(t)= lim
h↓0
v(t + h)− v(t)
h

A.1 Proofs of Proposition 3.2, Remark 3.1, and Corollary 3.3
Proof of Proposition 3.2. It suffices to show that limt↓t0
F1√
G2G3/G1
(t) = 1. Let t1 > t0
be very close to t0 and let 0 < L < 1 be such that Fi(t) ≤ L for any t ∈ (t0 t1), i = 123.
Consider the first equation in system (3.3) and use it to obtain that
G1(t1)≥
∫ t1
t0
(F2F3)
′(1−L)ds = (1−L)F2(t1)F3(t1)
G1(t1)≤ F2(t1)F3(t1)
Similarly, using the other two equations in (3.3), obtain that
(1−L)F1(t1)F3(t1)≤G2(t1)≤ F1(t1)F3(t1)
(1−L)F1(t1)F2(t1)≤G3(t1)≤ F1(t1)F2(t1)
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Because F1 =
√
F1F2F1F3
F2F3
, then
F1(t1)≤ 11−L
√
G2G3
G1
 F1(t1)≥
√
1−L
√
G2G3
G1

Because F1(t0) = 0 and t1 can be chosen arbitrarily close to t0, then L can be arbitrarily
close to 0. This implies that limt↓t0
F1√
G2G3/G1
(t)= 1. 
Proof of Corollary 3.3. Conditions (3.2) follow from Proposition 3.2 and the fact that
limt↓t0 Fi(t)= 0, i= 123. 
Proof of Remark 3.1. From (DE),
lim
t↓t0
g1
(F2F3)′
(t)= 1 lim
t↓t0
g2
(F1F3)′
(t)= 1 lim
t↓t0
g3
(F1F2)′
(t)= 1
From (3.1),
lim
t↓t0
G1
F2F3
(t)= 1 lim
t↓t0
G2
F1F3
(t)= 1 lim
t↓t0
G3
F1F2
(t)= 1
This implies, for instance, that
lim
t↓t0
g1(t)/G1(t)
F ′2(t)/F2(t)+ F ′3(t)/F3(t)
= 1
To summarize, from (DE) and (3.1), one obtains that there are constants L1 > 0 and
L2 > 0 such that(
F ′1
F1
+ F
′
2
F2
+ F
′
3
F3
)
(F1 + F2 + F3)
≥L1
(
g1
G1
+ g2
G2
+ g3
G3
)(√
G2G3
G1
+
√
G1G3
G2
+
√
G1G2
G3
)

(
F ′1
F1
+ F
′
2
F2
+ F
′
3
F3
)
(F1 + F2 + F3)
≤L2
(
g1
G1
+ g2
G2
+ g3
G3
)(√
G2G3
G1
+
√
G1G3
G2
+
√
G1G2
G3
)

which implies the statement of this remark. 
A.2 Strategy for proving identification
Theorems 3.4 and 3.5 follow from the proofs in Sections A.3 and A.4.
As mentioned in Section 3.4, my strategy for proving identification consists of two
logical steps: first establishing local identification and then establishing global identifi-
cation.
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It can be shown that (DE)–(IC) always has a negative local solution as well as a posi-
tive local solution.9 Conditions for uniqueness in the theory of differential equations do
not let us control the sign of solutions. Therefore, even though I am interested only in
a positive solution and can neglect a negative one, sufficient conditions that guarantee
uniqueness of a positive local solution cannot be derived from system (DE). To tackle
this problem, I use auxiliary tools.
Auxiliary tools I transform (DE) into a new system by introducing auxiliary functions
H1 = F2F3 H2 = F1F3 H3 = F1F2
Clearly, these functions are the distribution functions of max{X2X3}, max{X1X3}, and
max{X1X2}, respectively. Functions Fi are expressed through Hi as F21 = H2H3H1 , F22 =
H1H3
H2
, and F23 = H1H2H3 . Taking into account that Fi must be positive, I obtain
F1 =
√
H2H3
H1
 F2 =
√
H1H3
H2
 F3 =
√
H1H2
H3
 (A.1)
Thus, for any point t > t0, system (DE) can be written as
H ′1 =
g1
1−
√
H2H3
H1

H ′2 =
g2
1−
√
H1H3
H2

H ′3 =
g3
1−
√
H1H2
H3

Note that initial conditions Hi(t0)= 0 cannot be imposed because the right-hand sides
of the equations in this system are undefined when Hi takes value 0. Instead, I can set
conditions on the upper limit of Hi at t0:
lim
t↓t0
Hi(t)= 0 i= 123 (ICH )
The right-hand side of the last system is a vector-valued function that depends on t, H1,
H2, and H3. Denote it as
J(tH)=
(
g1(t)
1−
√
H2H3
H1

g2(t)
1−
√
H1H3
H2

g3(t)
1−
√
H1H2
H3
)tr
(A.2)
and rewrite the last system as
H ′(t)= J(tH(t)) (DEH )
9See Remark A.4 for further explanation.
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I refer to (DEH ) as an auxiliary system and refer to problem (DEH )–(ICH ) as an auxiliary
problem.
Definition A.1. Function H = (H1H2H3)tr is a solution to (DEH )–(ICH ) on an in-
terval (t0 t0 + a] if Hi are absolutely continuous on (t0 t0 + a], satisfy (DEH ) a.e. on
(t0 t0 + a], and also satisfy (ICH ).
Proof road map Because formulas (A.1) account for the sign of Fi, we automatically
consider positive solutions to (DE)–(IC). Thereafter, by a solution to (DE)–(IC), I will
always mean a positive solution.
The local identification result is proved in steps. In the first step, I show that con-
ditions (I) and (II) are sufficient to guarantee that problem (DEH )–(ICH ), which is the
auxiliary problem, has a local solution. In the second step, I use formulas (A.1) to find Fi
from Hi and show that these Fi constitute a local solution to the main problem. Last, for
the auxiliary problem, I establish that its local solution that was found in the first step is
unique. This implies that for the main problem, its local solution that was found in the
second step is the unique solution.
The global identification result is obtained from the local identification result by
showing how the unique local solution to (DE)–(IC) can be extended to the unique so-
lution on the whole support. The idea is to extend this local solution to small intervals
progressively farther to the right until the upper support point T is reached.
The identification proof below employs techniques of the theory of differential
equations. Descriptions of similar or related techniques can be found, for instance, in
Tonelli (1928), Sansone (1948), Hartman (1964), Szarski (1965), Coddington and Levin-
son (1972), and Filippov (1988).
A.3 Local identification
Proving local identification is the most difficult part of the identification proof. I show
that to establish the existence of a local solution, I only need conditions (I) and (II). To
obtain local uniqueness, I use condition (III) as well as (I) and (II).
A.3.1 Existence of a local solution I start by finding an interval on which a local so-
lution to the auxiliary problem (DEH )–(ICH ) and a local solution to the main problem
(DE)–(IC) exist. Then I prove local existence for (DEH )–(ICH ) and use this result to es-
tablish local existence for (DE)–(IC).
Before moving on, I must introduce some notation and carry out preliminary techni-
cal work. First of all, I have to indicate the domain of function J(tH). Take into account
formulas (A.1), which express F through H, and note that for the auxiliary problem, we
want to prove not only that there is a local solution, but also that this solution is such
that functions H2H3H1 ,
H1H3
H2
, and H1H2H3 take values less than 1 and the following conditions
hold:
lim
t↓t0
H2H3
H1
(t)= 0 lim
t↓t0
H1H3
H2
(t)= 0 lim
t↓t0
H1H2
H3
(t)= 0
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This accords with the fact that for function J(tH) to be well defined, the denominators
in J(tH) must be separated from 0. To do this, choose any δ ∈ (01) and allow H to take
values only in the sets
H¯0(δ)= (0∞)3 ∩
{
(h1h2h3)
tr :h2h3 ≤ δh1h1h3 ≤ δh2h2h3 ≤ δh1
}

Let D¯0(δ)= [t0T ]×H¯0(δ) be the domain of J(tH) (a.e. with respect to t). As we can see,
δ guarantees that the denominators in J(tH) are separated from 0 by the value 1− √δ.
To determine an interval of existence for a local solution, I use conditions (II).
Choose γ > 0 such that γ/(1 − √δ)2 ≤ δ. Let t0 + a, a > 0, be a point from [t0T ] such
that
∀(t ∈ [t0 t0 + a]) G2G3
G1
(t)≤ γ G1G3
G2
(t)≤ γ G1G2
G3
(t)≤ γ (A.3)
Conditions (II) guarantee that such t0+a exists. Interval [t0 t0+a] is an interval on which
a solution to problem (DEH )–(ICH ) exists.
Auxiliary system with ε The right-hand side J(tH) of the auxiliary system (DEH ) has
singularities in H when H1 = 0 or H2 = 0 or H3 = 0. These singularities can be handled
by using a very small ε > 0 and considering an auxiliary system with ε > 0,
H ′1 =
g1
1−
√
H2H3
H1 + ε

H ′2 =
g2
1−
√
H1H3
H2 + ε

H ′3 =
g3
1−
√
H1H2
H3 + ε

together with initial conditions
Hi(t0)= 0 i= 123 (ICHε)
Denote
Jε(tH)=
(
g1(t)
1−
√
H2H3
H1 + ε

g2(t)
1−
√
H1H3
H2 + ε

g3(t)
1−
√
H1H2
H3 + ε
)tr
and rewrite the system with ε as
H ′(t)= Jε(tH(t)) (DEHε)
The definition of a solution to (DEHε)–(ICHε) is analogous to Definition A.1 and defines
a solution on [t0 t0 + a] instead of (t0 t0 + a].
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Introduce
H¯(δ)= [0∞)3 ∩ {(h1h2h3)tr :h2h3 ≤ δh1h1h3 ≤ δh2h2h3 ≤ δh1}
and let D¯(δ) = [t0T ] × H¯(δ) be the domain of Jε(tH) (a.e. with respect to t). The dif-
ference between H¯(δ) and H¯0(δ) is that H¯(δ) allows Hi to take value 0.
Lemma A.1. Let observable functions Gi satisfy conditions (I) and (II). Let Jε(tH) be
defined on D¯(δ). Then (DEHε)–(ICHε) has a solution on [t0 t0 + a].
Proof. To prove this result, I use a Tonelli approximation approach, which builds spe-
cial approximations of a solution on very small intervals. These approximations have an
important property; when the lengths of the intervals go to zero, the sequence of ap-
proximations has a subsequence converging to a solution to (DEHε)–(ICHε).
Tonelli approximations are constructed in the following way. Consider, for example,
intervals [t0 t0 + 1k ] [t0 + 1k t0 + 2k ]     [t0 + rk  t0 + a], where a≤ r+1k and k is very large.
First, an approximation is built on [t0 t0 + 1k ], then it is extended to interval (t0 + 1k t0 +
2
k ]. Next, it is extended to (t0 + 2k t0 + 3k ] and so on. This process is continued until the
approximation is constructed on the whole interval [t0 t0 + a].
Now I turn to a description of the rule of constructing approximations. The integra-
tion of both sides in (DEHε) yields H(t) =
∫ t
t0
Jε(sH)ds. For a given k, denote a corre-
sponding Tonelli approximation as Hk = (Hk1 Hk2 Hk3 ). Function Hk is defined accord-
ing to the rule
Hk(t)=
∫ t
t0
Jε
(
sHk
(
s− 1
k
))
ds t ∈ [t0 t0 + a] (A.4)
Choose a k that is large enough. To carry out the first step of constructing an approxi-
mation on [t0 t0 + 1k ], let
Hki (t)= 0 t ∈ [t0 − 1 t0] i= 123
Let me show that formula (A.4) is meaningful. In the first step, it defines Hk(t) for t ∈
[t0 t0 + min{ 1ka}]. Because Jε(sHk(s − 1k)) = (g1(s) g2(s) g3(s))tr for any s ∈ [t0 t0 +
min{ 1ka}] and gi ∈ L1[t0 t0 + a], then the integral on the right-hand side exists. For the
next step to be well defined, I have to check that for t ∈ [t0 t0 + min{ 1ka}], the values of
the constructed function Hk(t)= (Hk1 Hk2 Hk3 )tr belong to H¯(δ). Indeed, Hki (t)=Gi(t).
Properties
Hk2 (t)H
k
3 (t)
Hk1 (t)
≤ δ, Hk1 (t)Hk3 (t)
Hk2 (t)
≤ δ, and Hk1 (t)Hk2 (t)
Hk3 (t)
≤ δ follow from (A.3) and the fact
that γ < δ. Therefore, Hk(t) ∈ H¯(δ).
In the second step, formula (A.4) defines Hk on [t0 + 1k t0 + min{ 2ka}]. For t ∈ [t0 +
1
k t0 +min{ 2ka}], the Lebesgue integral on the right-hand side is finite because function
Jε(sHk(s − 1k))ds is evidently measurable and bounded by a function that has a finite
Lebesgue integral:∣∣∣∣Jεi (sHk(s− 1k
))
ds
∣∣∣∣≤ gi(s)1− √δ ∈L1[t0 t0 + a] s ∈
[
t0 t0 +min
{
2
k
a
}]

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Clearly, Hki (t) > 0. Because H
k
2 (t)≤ G2(t)1−√δ , Hk3 (t)≤
G3(t)
1−√δ , and H
k
1 (t)≥G1(t), then
Hk2 (t)H
k
3 (t)
Hk1 (t)
≤ G2(t)G3(t)
(1− √δ)2G1(t)
≤ γ
(1− √δ)2 ≤ δ
Likewise,
Hk1 (t)H
k
3 (t)
Hk2 (t)
≤ G1(t)G3(t)
(1− √δ)2G2(t)
≤ γ
(1− √δ)2 ≤ δ
Hk1 (t)H
k
2 (t)
Hk3 (t)
≤ G1(t)G2(t)
(1− √δ)2G3(t)
≤ γ
(1− √δ)2 ≤ δ
Therefore, Hk(t) ∈ H¯(δ) for t ∈ [t0 + 1k t0 +min{ 2ka}].
All subsequent steps are similar to the second step. By continuing to construct ap-
proximations in this manner, I can eventually define function Hk on the whole interval
[t0 t0 + a].
I take progressively smaller intervals and obtain a sequence of approximations {Hk}.
Because for any k,
∥∥Hk(t)∥∥1 ≤ G1(t)+G2(t)+G3(t)1− √δ
(A.5)
≤ G1(t0 + a)+G2(t0 + a)+G3(t0 + a)
1− √δ 
functions Hk in this sequence are uniformly bounded. Moreover, sequence {Hk} is
equicontinuous, a property that is implied by inequality (A.6) and the absolute conti-
nuity of Gi on [t0 t0 + a]:
∥∥Hk(t)−Hk(τ)∥∥1 ≤ ‖G(t)−G(τ)‖11− √δ  t τ ∈ [t0 t0 + a] (A.6)
According to the Arzela–Ascoli theorem, sequence {Hk} is relatively compact in C([t0
t0 + a] H¯), so it contains a subsequence {Hkm} such that for some function Hε,
sup
t∈[t0t0+a]
∥∥Hε(t)−Hkm(t)∥∥1 → 0
as m→ ∞. Because
Jε
(
tHkm
(
t − 1
km
))
→ Jε(tHε(t)) a.e. [t0 t0 + a]
as m→ ∞, and a.e. on [t0 t0 + a],∥∥∥∥Jε(tHkm(t − 1km
))∥∥∥∥
1
≤ g1(t)+ g2(t)+ g3(t)
1− √δ ∈L
1[t0 t0 + a]
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then according to the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem, H solves
Hε(t)=
∫ t
t0
Jε
(
sHε(s)
)
ds t ∈ [t0 t0 + a]
The last equation implies that Hε is absolutely continuous and solves (DEHε)–(ICHε)
a.e. on [t0 t0 + a]. 
Local existence for the auxiliary problem The next proposition formulates the local ex-
istence result for the auxiliary problem.
Proposition A.2. Let observable functionsGi satisfy conditions (I) and (II). Let J(tH)
be defined on D¯0(δ). Then (DEH )–(ICH ) has a solution on (t0 t0 + a].
Proof. Choose a sequence εm such that εm → 0 as m → ∞. For every εm, denote a
solution constructed under Proposition A.1 for this εm as Hεm . As I proved, for every εm,
function Hεm is absolutely continuous on [t0 t0 + a] and Hεmi (t) > 0, t ∈ (t0 t0 + a].
Notice that the bounds in (A.5) and (A.6) do not depend on the value of ε; therefore,
∥∥Hεm(t)∥∥1 ≤ ‖G(t0 + a)‖11− √δ  t ∈ [t0 t0 + a]
and ∥∥Hεm(t)−Hεm(τ)∥∥1 ≤ ‖G(t)−G(τ)‖11− √δ  t τ ∈ [t0 t0 + a]
The last two inequalities and the Arzela–Ascoli theorem imply that sequence {Hεm } is
relatively compact in C([t0 t0 + a] H¯). Hence, it has a subsequence Hεml such that for
some function H,
sup
t∈[t0t0+a]
∥∥H(t)−Hεml (t)∥∥1 → 0
as l → ∞. Because
Jε
(
tHεml (t)
)→ J(tH(t)) a.e. [t0 t0 + a]
as l → ∞, and a.e. on [t0 t0 + a],∥∥Jεml (tHεml (t))∥∥1 ≤ g1(t)+ g2(t)+ g3(t)1− √δ ∈L1[t0 t0 + a]
the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem yields
H(t)=
∫ t
t0
J
(
sH(s)
)
ds t ∈ [t0 t0 + a]
From the last equation, it can be concluded that Hi are absolutely continuous on [t0
t0 + a] and constitute a solution to (DEH )–(ICH ) on (t0 t0 + a]. 
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It is remarkable that this existence result does not require any assumptions on ob-
servable Gi besides necessary conditions, which are satisfied in the model.
The proof of this proposition implies that if we take a solution H to (DEH )–(ICH ) on
(t0 t0+a] and define the function for t0 as H(t0)= (000)tr, then this extended function
is absolutely continuous on [t0 t0+a] and clearly satisfies (DEH )–(ICH ) a.e. on [t0 t0+a].
In other words, a solution H can be extended from (t0 t0 + a] to [t0 t0 + a].
The following explanation shows why I cannot use standard existence theorems to
prove Proposition A.2. A general form of a system of differential equations is
x′(t)= v(t x(t))
where x and v are vector-valued functions. Let the initial condition be
x(t0)= x0
In our problem, x is function H and v(tx) is J(tH).10 Existence theorems are usually
proved for the situation in which the domain of v is [t0 − h t0 + h] × B(x0) or [t0 t0 +
h] × B(x0), where B(x0) is an open ball with the center in x0.11 This property implies,
for example, that x0 is an interior point in the domain of v with respect to x. Existence
theorems are also proven for some more general cases, but all require, at the very least,
x0 to be an interior point in the domain of v with respect to x, and this domain must
satisfy certain properties. Because of the specificity of sets H¯0(δ) and H¯(δ), and the fact
that the point of the initial conditions (000)tr is on the border of these sets, I cannot
apply any of those results. The method of Tonelli approximation allows me to take into
account the specificity of H¯0(δ) and H¯(δ) by verifying at each step that the values of the
constructed Tonelli function belong to the domain H¯(δ).
Local existence for the main problem Now that I have established the local existence
result for the auxiliary problem (DEH )–(ICH ), I can turn to proving that the main prob-
lem (DE)–(IC) has a local solution. This result is easy to obtain if we recall how H and F
are related in formulas (A.1).
Theorem A.3. Let observable functionsGi satisfy conditions (I) and (II). Then (DE)–(IC)
has a solution on [t0 t0 + a].
Proof. Let H be a solution to (DEH )–(ICH ) on (t0 t0 + a]. For t > t0, define Fi according
to formulas (A.1), and let Fi(t0)= 0, i= 123. It follows from (DEH ) that 1≤ Hi(t)Gi(t) ≤ 11−√δ
for t ∈ (t0 t0 + a]. Then
F1(t)=
√
H2H3
H1
(t)≤ 1
1− √δ
√
G2G3
G1
(t) t ∈ (t0 t0 + a]
10Even though initial conditions (ICH ) characterize the limit at t0 rather than the value at t0, this does not
matter because, as I mentioned above, solution H can be extended from (t0 t0 + a] to [t0 t0 + a].
11For systems with discontinuous right-hand sides, this result is illustrated in Filippov (1988).
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which implies that F1 is continuous at t0 because
0≤ lim
t↓t0
F1(t)≤ 1
1− √δ limt↓t0
√
G2G3
G1
(t)= 0
Continuity of F2 and F3 at t0 is established in a similar way. Because functions Fi are
absolutely continuous on [t0 +Δ t0 +a] for any Δ ∈ (0 a) and are continuous at point t0,
they are absolutely continuous on [t0 t0 + a]. It is evident that Fi solve equations (DE)
a.e. on [t0 t0 + a]. 
Observe that because J(tH) is defined on D¯0(δ) and, therefore, a solution H to
(DEH )–(ICH ) takes values only in H¯0(δ), the values of the corresponding functions Fi
belong to [0√δ] only. The goal, however, is to identify Fi for all values in [01]. This will
be possible because δ can be arbitrarily close to 1.
Remark A.4. The last thing about the local existence that is worth mentioning con-
cerns the comment made in Section A.2 about the existence of a negative function F
that satisfies (DE) a.e. in a neighborhood of t0 and also satisfies (IC). Note that functions
Fi are expressed through Hi as F21 = H2H3H1 , F22 =
H1H3
H2
, and F23 = H1H2H3 , as follows from the
definition of functions Hi. Taking into account that Fi are positive, I obtained (A.1) and
substituted these formulas into (DE) to obtain the auxiliary system (DEH ). However, if
I were looking for negative solutions, I would substitute formulas
F1 = −
√
H2H3
H1
 F2 = −
√
H1H3
H2
 F3 = −
√
H1H2
H3
into (DE) and obtain a different form of the auxiliary system:
H ′1 =
g1
1+
√
H2H3
H1

H ′2 =
g2
1+
√
H1H3
H2
 (A.7)
H ′3 =
g3
1+
√
H1H2
H3

Using the techniques of this section, it can be shown that (A.7) with initial conditions
(ICH ) has a local solution H. This implies there is a negative function F that solves (DE)
a.e. in a neighborhood of t0.
A.3.2 Uniqueness of a local solution The next step in the proof of local identification is
to show that (DE)–(IC) has only one local solution. Local existence was proved without
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imposing any assumptions on Gi besides necessary conditions (I) and (II). To establish
local uniqueness, I will assume that condition (III) is also satisfied. In fact, condition (III)
is the most important condition for proving uniqueness.
I start by stating the local uniqueness result. It relies mostly on conditions (3.1),
which find the rate of convergence of Fi at t0 in terms of observable functions Gi.
Theorem A.5. Let observable functions Gi satisfy conditions (I), (II), and (III). Then
(DE)–(IC) has only one solution in a neighborhood of t0.
The idea of the proof of this theorem is to take two local solutions to problem (DE)–
(IC) and show that they coincide on their common interval of existence.
Suppose that F and F˜ are two local solutions to (DE)–(IC) with a common in-
terval of existence [t0 t0 + c], c > 0. Let Hi and H˜i be corresponding auxiliary func-
tions:
H1 = F2F3 H2 = F1F3 H3 = F1F2
H˜1 = F˜2F˜3 H˜2 = F˜1F˜3 H˜3 = F˜1F˜2
Clearly, if functions H and H˜ are identical, then F and F˜ coincide.
The lemma below is key to proving that functions H and H˜ are identical.
Lemma A.6. FunctionsH and H˜ satisfy the inequality, a.e. on [t0 t0 + c],∥∥H ′(t)− H˜ ′(t)∥∥1 ≤ Γ0(t)∥∥H(t)− H˜(t)∥∥1 (A.8)
where
Γ0(t)= C
(
g1
G1
(t)+ g2
G2
(t)+ g3
G3
(t)
)(√
G2G3
G1
(t)+
√
G1G3
G2
(t)+
√
G1G2
G3
(t)
)
and C > 0 is some constant.
Proof. From (DEH ), we obtain
H ′i − H˜ ′i =
gi(Fi − F˜i)
(1− Fi)(1− F˜i)
 i= 123 (A.9)
From equalities
H1 − H˜1 = F2(F3 − F˜3)+ F˜3(F2 − F˜2)
H2 − H˜2 = F1(F3 − F˜3)+ F˜3(F1 − F˜1)
H3 − H˜3 = F1(F2 − F˜2)+ F˜2(F1 − F˜1)
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we find that on (t0 t0 + c],
F1 − F˜1 = − F1
F˜3(F2 + F˜2)
(H1 − H˜1)+ F2
F˜3(F2 + F˜2)
(H2 − H˜2)
+ 1
F2 + F˜2
(H3 − H˜3)
F2 − F˜2 = F˜2
F˜3(F2 + F˜2)
(H1 − H˜1)− F2F˜2
F1F˜3(F2 + F˜2)
(H2 − H˜2)
(A.10)
+ F2
F1(F2 + F˜2)
(H3 − H˜3)
F3 − F˜3 = 1
F2 + F˜2
(H1 − H˜1)+ F˜2
(F2 + F˜2)F1
(H2 − H˜2)
− F˜3
(F2 + F˜2)F1
(H3 − H˜3)
According to (3.1), there exist constants C1 > 0, C2 > 0 such that on (t0 t0 + c],
C1 ≤ F1√
G2G3
G1
≤ C2 C1 ≤ F2√
G1G3
G2
≤ C2 C1 ≤ F3√
G1G2
G3
≤ C2
C1 ≤ F˜1√
G2G3
G1
≤ C2 C1 ≤ F˜2√
G1G3
G2
≤ C2 C1 ≤ F˜3√
G1G2
G3
≤ C2
(t0 + c can be taken close enough to t0). Then on (t0 t0 + c],
|F1 − F˜1| ≤K 1
G1
√
G2G3
G1
|H1 − H˜1| +K
√
G3
G1G2
|H2 − H˜2|
+K
√
G2
G1G3
|H3 − H˜3|
|F2 − F˜2| ≤K
√
G3
G1G2
|H1 − H˜1| +K 1
G2
√
G1G3
G2
|H2 − H˜2|
(A.11)
+K
√
G1
G2G3
|H3 − H˜3|
|F3 − F˜3| ≤K
√
G2
G1G3
|H1 − H˜1| +K
√
G1
G2G3
|H2 − H˜2|
+K 1
G3
√
G1G2
G3
|H3 − H˜3|
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where K > 0 is a constant expressed in terms of C1 and C2. Let L> 0 be a constant that
bounds Fi and F˜i from above on [t0 t0 + c]. Denote C = K(1−L)2 . Inequalities (A.11) and
equations (A.9) imply that, a.e. on [t0 t0 + c],
∥∥H ′ − H˜ ′∥∥1 ≤C( g1G1 + g2G2 + g3G3
)(√
G2G3
G1
+
√
G1G3
G2
+
√
G1G2
G3
)
‖H − H˜‖1

Establishing inequality (A.8) is the most challenging part of proving local unique-
ness.
Notice that because H and H˜ solve the auxiliary problem (DEH )–(ICH ), then, a.e. on
(t0 t0 + c],
H ′(t)= J(tH(t))
H˜ ′(t)= J(t H˜(t))
Therefore, inequality (A.8) can be rewritten as∥∥J(tH(t))− J(t H˜(t))∥∥1 ≤ Γ0(t)∥∥H(t)− H˜(t)∥∥1
This last inequality is a generalized local Lipschitz condition for function J(tH) with
respect to variable H. It holds only for the values of functions H and H˜ at the same
point t, but not for any two arbitrary values of variable H.
The following two lemmas prove that inequality (A.8) together with condition (III)
yield that H and H˜ are identical functions and, therefore, prove Theorem A.5.
Lemma A.7. Let z : [τξ] → n be an absolutely continuous function. Then ‖z‖1 has the
right derivativeDR‖z‖1 a.e. on [τξ] and
DR
∥∥z(t)∥∥1 ≤ ∥∥z′(t)∥∥1 a.e. on [τξ]
Proof. Hartman (1964) proves a similar lemma for smooth functions for the maxnorm
and the Euclidean norm. First, for any fixed i, consider function |zi|. Since zi is absolutely
continuous, |zi| is absolutely continuous too. Then DR|zi(t)| exists a.e. on [τξ].
Let t ∈ [τξ] be a point in which zi has a derivative. Use the definition of the right
derivative,
DR
∣∣zi(t)∣∣= lim
h→+0
|zi(t + h)| − |zi(t)|
h

to conclude that DR|zi(t)| = z′i(t) if zi(t) > 0 and DR|zi(t)| = −z′i(t) if zi(t) < 0. Indeed, if
zi(t) > 0, then zi(t +h) > 0 for small enough h, and DR|zi(t)| = z′i(t). In a similar way, we
consider the case zi(t) < 0. If zi(t)= 0, then
DR
∣∣zi(t)∣∣= lim
h→0+
|zi(t + h)|
h
=
∣∣∣∣ limh→0+ zi(t + h)h
∣∣∣∣= ∣∣z′i(t)∣∣
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In all three cases, DR|zi(t)| ≤ |z′i(t)|.
Function ‖z‖1 is the sum of absolutely continuous functions and, hence, is abso-
lutely continuous. Then, a.e. on [τξ],
DR
∥∥z(t)∥∥1 =DR
(
n∑
i=1
∣∣zi(t)∣∣
)
=
n∑
i=1
DR
∣∣zi(t)∣∣≤ n∑
i=1
∣∣z′i(t)∣∣= ∥∥z′(t)∥∥1 
Lemma A.8. Let function v : [τξ] →  be absolutely continuous. Suppose that v(τ) = 0
and, a.e. on [τξ],
DRv(t)≤ Γ (t)v(t) where Γ ∈L1[τξ]
Then
v(t)≤ 0 t ∈ [τξ]
Proof. Results similar to the one in this lemma have been obtained by researchers on
a more general level. However, it is easier to prove this lemma directly than to show how
it follows from more general results.
Function φ(t)= v(t)e−
∫ t
τ Γ (s)ds is absolutely continuous as the product of two abso-
lutely continuous function and
DRφ(t)=DR
(
v(t)
)
e−
∫ t
τ Γ (s)ds − Γ (t)v(t)e−
∫ t
τ Γ (s)ds ≤ 0 a.e. [τξ]
Szarski (1965) uses Zygmund’s lemma to show that if φ is absolutely continuous and
DRφ(t)≤ 0 a.e. on [τξ], then φ is nonincreasing on [τξ]. Since φ(τ)= 0, then φ(t)≤ 0
on [τξ] and, hence, v(t)≤ 0 on [τξ]. 
Let me explain in more detail how these two lemmas imply that functions H and
H˜ coincide on [t0 t0 + c]. Consider [τξ] = [t0 t0 + c]. In the first lemma, take z(t) =
H(t)− H˜(t) and use inequality (A.8) to obtain
DR
∥∥H(t)− H˜(t)∥∥1 ≤ Γ0(t)∥∥H(t)− H˜(t)∥∥1
In the second lemma, let v(t)= ‖H(t)− H˜(t)‖1 and Γ (t)= Γ0(t). Because condition
(III) holds, then according to this lemma, ‖H(t)− H˜(t)‖1 ≤ 0, t ∈ [t0 t0 + c]. This means
that ‖H(t) − H˜(t)‖1 = 0, t ∈ [t0 t0 + c], or, in other words, functions H and H˜ coincide
on [t0 t0 + c]. In turn, this implies that functions F and F˜ coincide on [t0 t0 + c] too.
To summarize, I have shown that, given conditions (I), (II), and (III) on observable
functions Gi, problem (DE)–(IC) has the unique solution F in a neighborhood of t0. As
mentioned in Section 3, this solution is assumed to be monotone.
A.4 Global identification
Now I establish that the local solution to (DE)–(IC) can be extended to a solution on the
entire interval [t0T ] and that such an extension is unique.
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Consider Figure 3 and the local solution F on [t0 t0+c] depicted on the left in this fig-
ure. Notice that all functions Fi take positive values at t0 + c and these values are known.
Denote them as vi = Fi(t0 + c), vi > 0. To extend the local solution to the right, I need to
solve system (DE) in a right-hand side neighborhood of t0 + c given that functions Fi in
a solution to this system take values vi at t0 + c. Clearly, results of Theorems A.3 and A.5
cannot be used for this problem because the methods in these theorems were developed
for the situation when all initial values of Fi are 0. Therefore, to carry out the extension
process, I first need to prove the local existence and uniqueness result for the case when
all the initial values of Fi are positive.
A.4.1 Positive initial values Let t1 ∈ (t0T ) and let functions Fi satisfy initial conditions
Fi(t1)= vi i= 123 (A.12)
where vi are known, 0< vi < 1. Notice that the values of Gi(t1) are known.
I first consider the auxiliary system (DEH ). The initial conditions on functions Hi are
obviously
H1(t1)= v2v3 H2(t1)= v1v3 H3(t1)= v1v2 (A.13)
Proposition A.9. Let observable functionsGi satisfy conditions (I). Then (DEH )–(A.13)
has a solution in a right-hand neighborhood of t1.
Proof. The proof uses the Tonelli approximations approach. It is similar to the proof of
Lemma A.1 and differs from it in technical details.
Let me first specify the domain of the right-hand side J(tH) of the auxiliary system
(DEH ) and find a solution’s interval of existence. Let Δ > 0 be any number such that
Δ<min{1− v11− v21− v3}. Define set
H¯(Δ) = [0∞)3 ∩ {(h1h2h3)tr :h2h3 ≤ (v1 +Δ)2h1
h1h3 ≤ (v2 +Δ)2h2h2h3 ≤ (v3 +Δ)2h1
}

Let the domain of J(tH) be D¯(Δ) = [t1T ] × H¯. For a given Δ, I can always choose a
γ > 0 small enough so that
(1+ γ)2v21 ≤ (v1 +Δ)2 (1+ γ)2v22 ≤ (v2 +Δ)2 (1+ γ)2v23 ≤ (v3 +Δ)2
Because limt↓t1 Gi(t)=Gi(t1), there exists a point t1 + a1, a1 > 0, from [t1T ] such that
G1(t1 + a1)−G1(t1)≤ γv2v3(1− v1 −Δ)
G2(t1 + a1)−G2(t1)≤ γv1v3(1− v2 −Δ)
G3(t1 + a1)−G3(t1)≤ γv1v2(1− v3 −Δ)
Interval [t1 t1 + a1] is an interval on which a local solution exists.
Now I construct Tonelli approximations. For any natural number k, let
Hk1 (t)= v2v3 Hk2 (t)= v1v3 Hk3 (t)= v1v2
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for t ∈ [t1 − 1 t1]. Denote v0 = (v2v3 v1v3 v1v2)tr and let vi0 be i’s coordinate of v0, i =
123. Define function
Hk(t)= v0 +
∫ t
t1
J
(
sHk
(
s− 1
k
))
ds t ∈ [t1 t1 + a1] (A.14)
This formula is meaningful. In the first step it defines H on [t1 t1+min{ 1ka1}]. For t from
this interval, the Lebesgue integral on the right-hand side is finite because the integrand
is bounded from above by functions from L1[t1 t1 + a1]:∣∣∣∣Ji(sHk(s− 1k
))∣∣∣∣≤ gi(s)1− vi  s ∈
[
t1 t1 +min
{
1
k
a1
}]

Evidently, for t ∈ [t1 t1 +min{ 1ka1}],
Hk1 (t)= v2v3 +
G1(t)−G1(t1)
1− v1 
Hk2 (t)= v1v3 +
G2(t)−G2(t1)
1− v2 
Hk3 (t)= v1v2 +
G3(t)−G3(t1)
1− v3 
Let me show that Hk(t) ∈ H¯ for t ∈ [t1 t1 + min{ 1ka1}]. Consider, for instance,
Hk2H
k
3
Hk1
.
Because
Hk2 (t)≤ v1v3 +
G2(t1 + a1)−G2(t1)
1− v2 ≤ v1v3 +
γv1v3(1− v2 −Δ)
1− v2 ≤ (1+ γ)v1v3
Hk3 (t)≤ (1+ γ)v1v2
Hk1 (t)≥ v2v3
then
Hk2 (t)H
k
3 (t)
Hk1 (t)
≤ (1+ γ)2v21 ≤ (v1 +Δ)2
Likewise,
Hk1 (t)H
k
3 (t)
Hk2 (t)
≤ (v2 +Δ)2
Hk1 (t)H
k
2 (t)
Hk3 (t)
≤ (v3 +Δ)2
In the second step, formula (A.14) defines H on [t1 + 1k t1 + min{ 2ka1}]. For t from
this interval, the Lebesgue integral on the right-hand side is finite because∣∣∣∣Ji(sHk(s− 1k
))∣∣∣∣≤ gi(s)1− vi −Δ ∈L1[t1 t1 + a1] s ∈
[
t1 t1 +min
{
2
k
a1
}]

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Note that Hk(t) ∈ H¯ for t ∈ [t1 + 1k t1 +min{ 2ka1}]. Indeed,
Hk2 (t)≤ v1v3 +
G2(t1 + a1)−G2(t1)
1− v2 −Δ ≤ v1v3 + γv1v3 = (1+ γ)v1v3
Hk3 (t)≤ (1+ γ)v1v2
Hk1 (t)≥ v2v3
Therefore,
Hk2 (t)H
k
3 (t)
Hk1 (t)
≤ (1+ γ)2v21 ≤ (v1 +Δ)2
In a similar way, I can show that for t ∈ [t1 + 1k t1 +min{ 2ka1}],
Hk1 (t)H
k
3 (t)
Hk2 (t)
≤ (v2 +Δ)2
Hk1 (t)H
k
2 (t)
Hk3 (t)
≤ (v3 +Δ)2
This process continues and defines function Hk on the whole interval [t1 t1 + a1].
Now let me obtain the properties of sequence {Hk}. Inequality∥∥Hk(t)∥∥1 ≤ (1+ γ)(v2v3 + v1v3 + v1v2)
for all t ∈ [t1 t1 + a1] implies that sequence {Hk} is uniformly bounded.
Because for any t τ ∈ [t1 t1 + a1],
∥∥Hk(t)−Hk(τ)∥∥1 ≤ |G1(t)−G1(τ)|1− v1 −Δ + |G2(t)−G2(τ)|1− v2 −Δ + |G3(t)−G3(τ)|1− v3 −Δ
≤ ‖G(t)−G(τ)‖1
1−max{v1 +Δv2 +Δv3 +Δ} 
and Gi are absolutely continuous on [t1 t1 +a1], then sequence {Hk} is equicontinuous.
According to the Arzela–Ascoli theorem, {Hk} is relatively compact in C([t1 t1 + a1] H¯).
Hence, it contains a subsequence Hkm such that for some function H,
sup
[t1t1+a1]
∥∥H(t)−Hkm(t)∥∥1 → 0 as m→ ∞
Because
J
(
tHkm
(
t − 1
km
))
→ J(tH(t)) a.e. on [t1 t1 + a1]
and a.e. on [t1 t1 + a1],∣∣∣∣J(tHkm(t − 1km
))∣∣∣∣≤ g1(t)+ g2(t)+ g3(t)1−max{v1 +Δv2 +Δv3 +Δ} ∈L1[t1 t1 + a]
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then by the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem, H(t) solves
H(t)= v0 +
∫ t
t1
J
(
sH(s)
)
ds t ∈ [t1 t1 + a1]
which implies thatHi are absolutely continuous and solve (DEH )–(A.13) on [t1 t1+a1].
The existence result of Proposition A.2 also required Gi to satisfy conditions (II).
Note that because the values of the underlying distribution functions Fi at t1 are sep-
arated from 0, then the result of Proposition A.9 does not require any conditions on the
behavior of Gi around t1.
The next theorem establishes the local existence and uniqueness result for problem
(DE)–(A.12). It is noteworthy that conditions Fi(t1) > 0 guarantee the uniqueness result
without any additional conditions on functions Gi.
Theorem A.10. Let observable functionsGi satisfy conditions (I). Then (DE)–(A.12) has
only one solution in a right-hand neighborhood of t1.
Proof. According to Proposition A.9, problem (DEH )–(A.13) has a solution H on [t1 t1+
a1], a1 > 0. Use this solution to find functions
F1 =
√
H2H3
H1
 F2 =
√
H1H3
H2
 F3 =
√
H1H2
H3

Clearly, F = (F1F2F3)tr is absolutely continuous and solves (DE)–(A.12) on [t1 t1 +a1].
The uniqueness proof is based on obtaining a generalized local Lipschitz condition
(A.8). Let F and F˜ be two local solutions of (DE)–(A.12). Without a loss of generality,
assume that [t1 t1 + a1] is their common interval of existence. Let H and H˜ be their
corresponding auxiliary functions:
H1 = F2F3 H2 = F1F3 H3 = F1F2
H˜1 = F˜2F˜3 H˜2 = F˜1F˜3 H˜3 = F˜1F˜2
Functions H and H˜ solve the auxiliary system (DEH ) a.e. on [t1 t1 + a1].
The proof of the uniqueness part of this theorem is much easier than the proof for
problem (DE)–(IC). Indeed, for (DE)–(IC), the difficulty of proving uniqueness stemmed
from the fact that all Fi had values 0 at t0. Now all Fi(t1) are positive. Use (A.10) and the
fact that Fi are separated from 0 in a neighborhood of t1 (without a loss of generality, a1
is small enough) to obtain
|Fi − F˜i| ≤K‖H − H˜‖1
on [t1 t1 +a1] for some constant K. Exploit (A.9) and establish that for some constant C,∥∥H ′(t)− H˜ ′(t)∥∥1 ≤ C(g1(t)+ g2(t)+ g3(t))∥∥H(t)− H˜(t)∥∥1
a.e. on [t1 t1 + a1]. Because gi ∈ L1[t1 t1 + a1], then Lemmas A.7 and A.8 imply that H
and H˜ coincide on [t1 t1 + a1]. Hence, F and F˜ coincide on this interval too. 
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A.4.2 Extension of the local solution to the whole support Now I turn to the final ele-
ment of the identification proof. I demonstrate how the unique local solution to (DE)–
(IC) can be uniquely extended to a solution on the whole support. Throughout this sec-
tion, I assume that functions Fi obtained fromHi are strictly monotone, that is, the ratios
H2H3
H1
, H1H3H2 , and
H1H2
H3
are strictly increasing.
To begin, recall that in the proof of the existence result in Section A.3.1, function
J(tH) was defined on D¯0(δ) and the values of function H were restricted to set H¯(δ)
for a chosen 0< δ< 1:
H¯0(δ)= (0∞)3 ∩
{
(h1h2h3)
tr :h2h3 ≤ δh1h1h3 ≤ δh2h2h3 ≤ δh1
}

Because the local solution to the auxiliary problem takes values only in this set, the func-
tions Fi in the corresponding local solution to the main problem (DEH )–(ICH ) take val-
ues in [0√δ] only. However, we also want to identify Fi when these functions take values
above
√
δ. Notice that δ < 1 could be chosen arbitrarily close to 1 and this will allow the
extension of the local solution to the whole support.
Fix δ, 0 < δ < 1, and let the domain of J(tH) be D¯0(δ) = [t0T ] × H¯0(δ) (a.e. with
respect to t). Theorem A.5 proved that given conditions (I), (II), and (III), system (DEH )
with initial conditions (ICH ) has the unique solution H = (H1H2H3) on some interval
[t0 t0 + c]. Denote t1 = t0 + c and calculate
xi1 =Hi(t1) i= 123
Because Hi are strictly increasing functions, then xi1 > 0. Note that H(t1) ∈ H¯0(δ). If
H(t1) is an interior point in H¯0(δ), that is, if
x11x21
x31
< δ
x11x31
x21
< δ
x21x31
x11
< δ
then (t1H(t1)) is an interior point of D¯0(δ) and, therefore, J(tH) is defined in a neigh-
borhood of this point. This means that the auxiliary system (DEH ), considered for t ≥ t1,
with initial conditions
Hi(t1)= xi1 i= 123
is a well defined problem. In light of the results of Proposition A.9 and Theorem A.10, this
problem has a unique solutionH on some interval [t1 t1+μ],μ> 0. Thus, I can uniquely
extend the local solution found on [t0 t1] to a solution on the interval [t0 t1 + μ]. Note
that the value of H(t1 + μ) belongs to H¯0(δ). If this value is in the interior of set H¯0(δ),
I can extend the solution even farther to the right and continue this process until I reach
a point in which the value of function H becomes located on the border of set H¯0(δ).
This point determines the solution’s right maximal interval of existence for the given
value of δ.
Definition A.2. An interval [t0 ξ] is the maximal interval of existence of solution H to
(DEH )–(ICH ) if there does not exist an extension of H over an interval [t0 ξ + η] such
that η> 0 and H remains a solution to (DEH )–(ICH ).
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In the case that I am currently considering, the solution’s maximal interval of exis-
tence is determined by the value of δ that was chosen to define set H¯0(δ). The proposi-
tion below yields an explicit formula for this interval.
Proposition A.11. Let function J(tH) be defined on D¯0(δ). Assume that all conditions
on Gi that guarantee existence and uniqueness of a local solution to (DEH )–(ICH ) are
satisfied. Themaximal interval of existence of solutionH to (DEH )–(ICH ) is [t0Tδ], where
Tδ is such that
max
{
H2(Tδ)H3(Tδ)
H1(Tδ)

H1(Tδ)H3(Tδ)
H2(Tδ)

H1(Tδ)H2(Tδ)
H3(Tδ)
}
= δ
This proposition follows from the discussion above and, therefore, it is left without a
proof.
Proposition A.11 implies that for the given δ, [t0Tδ] is the maximal interval of exis-
tence of a corresponding solution F to problem (DE)–(IC). Also, the values of functions
Fi on [t0Tδ] belong to [0
√
δ] and, for point Tδ,
max
{
F1(Tδ)F2(Tδ)F3(Tδ)
}= √δ
Figure 4 depicts maximal intervals of existence of a solution F for values δ1 and δ2,
where δ2 > δ1. Maximal interval [t0Tδ1] corresponds to δ1 and maximal interval [t0Tδ2]
corresponds to δ2. Because functions Fi are strictly increasing, then Tδ2 > Tδ1 . Intu-
itively, if δ approaches 1, then the maximal interval of existence approaches support
[t0T ]. The theorem below establishes this fact.
Theorem A.12. Consider a strictly increasing sequence δn, n ≥ 1, such that δn < 1 and
δn → 1 as n → ∞. Assume that all conditions on Gi that guarantee the existence and
uniqueness of a local solution to problem (DEH )–(ICH ) are satisfied. Let [t0Tδn ] be the
Figure 4. Maximal intervals of existence of a solution to the main problem: [t0Tδ1 ] corre-
sponds to δ1 (left) and [t0Tδ2 ] corresponds to δ2, where δ2 > δ1 (right).
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maximal interval of existence for the solution to (DEH )–(ICH ) when J(tH) is defined on
D¯0(δn). Then Tδn is determined from
max
{
H2(Tδn)H3(Tδn)
H1(Tδn)

H1(Tδn)H3(Tδn)
H2(Tδn)

H1(Tδn)H2(Tδn)
H3(Tδn)
}
= δn (A.15)
and Tδn is a strictly increasing sequence. If
Fi(T)= 1 i= 123 (A.16)
then Tδn → T as n→ ∞.
Proof. Proposition A.11 clearly implies (A.15). Because functions H2H3H1 ,
H1H3
H2
, and
H1H2
H3
, and sequence δn are strictly increasing, (A.15) implies that sequence Tδn is strictly
increasing. Because Tδn increases and is bounded from above by T , it converges to some
point T¯ ≤ T . If T¯ < T , then we get a contradiction with the condition δn → 1 and condi-
tions (A.16). Thus, T¯ = T . 
Taking into account that F21 = H2H3H1 , F22 =
H1H3
H2
, and F23 = H1H2H3 , we can see that The-
orem A.12 guarantees that by choosing δ arbitrarily close to 1, we will identify Fi on the
whole support [t0T ]. This completes the proof of identification.
Remark Here I briefly discuss what happens when distributions have different upper
support points or holes in the support.
Let τi denote the upper support point of the distribution of values for bidder i,
i= 123. Without a loss of generality, τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ τ3. The identification of Fi, i= 123, on
[t0 τ1] can be shown by using techniques from Sections A.2–A.4. It holds that F1(τ1)= 1.
If τ1 = τ2 < τ3, then F2(τ1) = 1 and F3(τ1) < 1, and F3 is not identified on (τ2 τ3] since
there are no prices observed in this interval. If τ1 < τ2, then F2(τ1) < 1 and F3(τ1) < 1.
The values of F2(τ1) and F3(τ1) are known and strictly positive, and they are initial con-
ditions for the system
F ′2 =
g3(1− F2)
1−G2 −G3  F
′
3 =
g2(1− F3)
1−G2 −G3
considered for t ∈ [τ1 τ2]. This system relates observables and unobservables for bid-
ders 2 and 3 on [τ1 τ2]. The identification of F2 and F3 on [τ1 τ2] can be shown by using
techniques from Section A.4. Then F2(τ2) = 1. If τ2 = τ3, then F3(τ2) = 1 and, thus, all
distribution functions are fully identified. If τ2 < τ3, then F3(τ2) < 1, and F3 is not iden-
tified on (τ2 τ3] since there are no prices observed in this interval. To summarize, Fi,
i = 123, are identified from t0 and up to the second-highest upper support point. For
more details, see Komarova (2009).
As for the holes in the support, suppose that each Fi is strictly increasing in a small
neighborhood of t0, but can have flat parts on (t0T ). Because observable functions Gi
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are strictly increasing in a neighborhood of t0, the local identification result can be estab-
lished as in Theorems A.3 and A.5. The proof of Theorem A.10 for positive initial values
and the rest of the global extension techniques require Fi to be increasing, but not nec-
essarily strictly increasing, outside of a small neighborhood of t0. Thus, Fi can have flat
parts on (t0T ).
A.5 Auctions with any number of bidders
Proofs of Propositions 3.6 and 3.7 and Corollary 3.8 are similar to those of Propositions
3.1 and 3.2 and Corollary 3.3.
Proof of Theorem 3.9. I can use the same approach as in the case of three bidders.
System (3.6) can be rewritten in a convenient form by introducing d auxiliary func-
tions H1H2    Hd that stand for the distribution functions of max{X2X3    Xd}
max{X1X3    Xd}    max{X1X2    Xd−1}, respectively:
H1 = F2F3 · · ·Fd H2 = F1F3 · · ·Fd     Hd = F1F2 · · ·Fd−1
For t > t0, functions Fi can be expressed through Hi as
F1 =
(
H2H3 · · ·Hd
Hd−21
)1/(d−1)
     Fd =
(
H1H2 · · ·Hd−1
Hd−2d
)1/(d−1)
 (A.17)
Therefore, (3.6) can be rewritten as
H ′i =
gi
1−
(
H1 · · ·Hi−1Hi+1 · · ·Hd
Hd−2i
)1/(d−1)  i= 1     d (A.18)
This system, together with initial conditions
lim
t↓t0
Hi(t)= 0 i= 1     d (A.19)
constitutes an auxiliary problem. To deal with discontinuities in H on the right-hand
side in (A.18), I introduce a very small number ε > 0 and obtain an auxiliary system
with ε:
H ′i =
gi
1−
(
H1 · · ·Hi−1Hi+1 · · ·Hd
Hd−2i + ε
)1/(d−1)  i= 1     d
As in the case of three bidders, first I can establish local existence for the auxiliary
system with ε. Then I can show the existence of a local solution to the auxiliary prob-
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lem (A.18)–(A.19) by letting ε→ 0. After that, I can use formulas (A.17), which express F
through H, to prove that the main problem (3.6)–(3.7) has a local solution.12 
Proof of Theorem 3.10. The existence part of this theorem follows from Theorem 3.9.
To prove the uniqueness part, let F and F˜ be two solutions to (3.6)–(3.7) with a common
interval of existence [t0 t0 + c], c > 0. Let
Hi = F1 · · ·Fi−1Fi+1 · · ·Fd H˜i = F˜1 · · · F˜i−1F˜i+1 · · · F˜d i= 1     d
The idea is to derive an inequality similar to (A.8). Use (A.17) and (A.18) to obtain that,
a.e. on [t0 t0 + c],
H ′i − H˜ ′i =
gi(Fi − F˜i)
(1− Fi)(1− F˜i)
 (A.20)
The definitions of H and H˜ allow me to express H − H˜ through F − F˜ as
H − H˜ = B(F F˜)(F − F˜)
where a d × d matrix B(F F˜) depends on F and F˜ in the manner
B(F F˜)=
⎛⎜⎜⎝
0 F3F4 · · ·Fd F˜2F4 · · ·Fd
F3F4 · · ·Fd 0 F˜1F4 · · ·Fd
· · · · · · · · ·
F2F3 · · ·Fd−1 F˜1F3 · · ·Fd−1 F˜1F˜2F4 · · ·Fd
F˜2F˜3F5 · · ·Fd · · · F˜2F˜3 · · · F˜d−1
F˜1F˜3F5 · · ·Fd · · · F˜1F˜3 · · · F˜d−1
· · ·
F˜1F˜2F˜3 · · ·Fd · · · 0
⎞⎟⎟⎠ 
The result of Proposition 3.7 implies that limt↓t0
Fi
F˜i
(t)= 1. Therefore, for a t close enough
to t0 (without a loss of generality, I can assume that t0 + c is close enough to t0), matrix
B(F F˜) can be written as
B(F F˜)= (I +Mo(1)(F F˜))B0(F)
where I is the d × d identity matrix, Mo(1)(F F˜) is a d × d matrix such that each of its
elements is o(1) as t → t0, and B0(F)= B(FF):
B0(F)=
⎛⎜⎜⎝
0 F3F4 · · ·Fd F2F4 · · ·Fd
F3F4 · · ·Fd 0 F1F4 · · ·Fd
· · · · · · · · ·
F2F3 · · ·Fd−1 F1F3 · · ·Fd−1 F1F2F4 · · ·Fd
F2F3F5 · · ·Fd · · · F2F3    Fd−1
F1F3F5 · · ·Fd · · · F1F3 · · ·Fd−1
· · ·
F1F2F3 · · ·Fd · · · 0
⎞⎟⎟⎠ 
12A detailed proof of Theorem 3.9 is available on request.
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Matrix B0(F) is symmetric and invertible at any point t = t0. The inverse matrix is
B−10 (F) =
1
(d − 1)F1F2 · · ·Fd
×
⎛⎜⎜⎝
−(d − 2)F21 F1F2 F1F3 F1F4 · · · F1Fd
F1F2 −(d − 2)F22 F2F3 F2F4 · · · F2Fd
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
F1Fd F2Fd F3Fd F4Fd · · · −(d − 2)F2d
⎞⎟⎟⎠ 
Thus, F − F˜ can be expressed through H − H˜ as
F − F˜ = B−10 (F)
(
I +Mo(1)(F F˜)
)−1
(H − H˜) (A.21)
The next step is to bound on [t0 t0 + c] the absolute values of the elements in B−10 (F)
by observable functions. This is achieved by using the result of Proposition 3.7. Take, for
instance, the element B−10 (F)11 in the first row and the first column:∣∣B−10 (F)11∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ (d − 2)F1(d − 1)F2 · · ·Fd
∣∣∣∣
≤ K11
(
G2 · · ·Gd
Gd−21
)1/(d−1)
d∏
i=2
(
G1 · · ·Gi−1Gi+1 · · ·Gd
Gd−2i
)1/(d−1) = K11G1
(
G2 · · ·Gd
Gd−21
)1/(d−1)
for some constant K11. Consider another cell in B
−1
0 (F), for example, the element
B−10 (F)12 in the first row and the second column:∣∣B−10 (F)12∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ 1(d − 1)F3 · · ·Fd
∣∣∣∣
≤ K12
d∏
i=3
(
G1 · · ·Gi−1Gi+1 · · ·Gd
Gd−2i
)−1/(d−1)
= K12
G1
(
G1G3 · · ·Gd
Gd−22
)1/(d−1)
for some constant K12. For the other elements, bounds are found in a similar way. Then
equations (A.20) and (A.21) yield that, a.e. on [t0 t0 + c],
∥∥H ′ − H˜ ′∥∥1 ≤ C d∑
i=1
(
G1G2 · · ·Gi−1Gi+1 · · ·Gd
Gd−2i
)1/(d−1)
·
d∑
i=1
gi
Gi
‖H − H˜‖1
for some constant C. The last inequality and Lemmas A.7 and A.8 imply that H and H˜
coincide on [t0 t0 + c] and, hence, F and F˜ coincide on [t0 t0 + c]. 
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A.6 Auctions with two types of bidders
Proof of Theorem 3.11. Note that for each i, Gi(t) = G˜I(t)/k if bidder i is of type I
and Gi(t) = G˜II(t)/(d − k) if bidder i is of type II. To establish necessity, use Proposi-
tion 3.6, which implies that conditions (i)–(iii) of this theorem are satisfied for G˜I/k and
G˜II/(d − k). Clearly, then conditions (i)–(iii) hold for G˜I and G˜II too. Sufficiency follows
from Theorem 3.12 by considering ψ(x)= − lnx, x ∈ (01]. 
Proof of Theorem 3.12. Without a loss of generality, suppose that bidders 1    k are
of type I and bidders k+ 1     d are of type II. Introduce functions
ΣI(t)= C
(
1FI(t)    FI(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−1
FII(t)    FII(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
d−k
)
=ψ−1((k− 1)ψ(FI(t))+ (d − k)ψ(FII(t)))
ΣII(t)= C
(
FI(t)    FI(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
FII(t)    FII(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
d−k−1
1
)
=ψ−1(kψ(FI(t))+ (d − k− 1)ψ(FII(t)))
Function ΣI is the distribution function of max{X2    XkXk+1    Xd}. As can be
seen, this maximum does not contain the private value of the first bidder of type I. Due
to the exchangeability property of the joint distribution of private values, ΣI is also the
distribution function of max{X1    Xj−1Xj+1    Xk+1    Xd} for any j = 2    k.
Thus, we can consider any such maximum that excludes the private value of one of the
bidders of type I.
Function ΣII is the distribution function of max{X1    XkXk+1    Xd−1}.
Due to exchangeability, it is also the distribution function of max{X1    Xk    Xj−1
Xj+1    Xd} for any j = k+ 1     d − 1.
Suppose bidder i is of type I. Then
Gi(t) = Pr(price ≤ t i wins)
= P
(
max
j =i
Xj <Ximax
j =i
Xj ≤ t
)
= P
(
max
j =i
Xj ≤ tXi > t
)
+ P
(
max
j =i
Xj <XiXi ≤ t
)
= P
(
max
j =i
Xj ≤ t
)
− P
(
max
j =i
Xj ≤ tXi ≤ t
)
+ P
(
max
j =i
Xj <XiXi ≤ t
)
= ΣI(t)−ψ−1
(
kψ
(
FI(t)
)+ (d − k)ψ(FII(t)))+ P(max
j =i
Xj <XiXi ≤ t
)

Let Qi(s1 s2) denote the value of the distribution function of (maxj =i XjXi) at (s1 s2):
Qi(s1 s2) = P
(
max
j =i
Xj ≤ s1Xi ≤ s2
)
= ψ−1((k− 1)ψ(FI(s1))+ (d − k)ψ(FII(s1))+ψ(FI(s2)))
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It can be shown that the joint density of (maxj =i XjXi) is ∂
2Qi
∂s1 ∂s2
(s1 s2) = ∂2Qi∂s2 ∂s1 (s1 s2).
Then
P
(
max
j =i
Xj <XiXi ≤ t
)
=
∫ t
t0
∂Qi
∂s2
(s s)ds
=
∫ t
t0
ψ′(FI(s))F ′I(s)
ψ′(ψ−1(kψ(FI(s))+ (d − k)ψ(FII(s)))) ds
Now use the fact that G˜I(t)= kGi(t) to obtain
G˜I(t)
k
= ΣI(t)−ψ−1
(
kψ
(
FI(t)
)+ (d − k)ψ(FII(t)))
+
∫ t
t0
ψ′(FI(s))F ′I(s)
ψ′(ψ−1(kψ(FI(s))+ (d − k)ψ(FII(s)))) ds
Similarly, considering Gi(t) when bidder i is of type II, obtain that
G˜II(t)
d − k = ΣII(t)−ψ
−1(kψ(FI(t))+ (d − k)ψ(FII(t)))
+
∫ t
t0
ψ′(FII(s))F ′II(s)
ψ′(ψ−1(kψ(FI(s))+ (d − k)ψ(FII(s)))) ds
Denote GI(t) = G˜I(t)/k and GII(t) = G˜II(t)/(d − k). Differentiate the equation for
G˜I to obtain
G′I(t) = Σ′I(t)−
kψ′(FI(t))F ′I(t)+ (d − k)ψ′(FII(t))F ′II(t)
ψ′(ψ−1(kψ(FI(t))+ (d − k)ψ(FII(t))))
+ ψ
′(FI(t))F ′I(t)
ψ′(ψ−1(kψ(FI(t))+ (d − k)ψ(FII(t))))
= Σ′I(t)−
(k− 1)ψ′(FI(t))F ′I(t)+ (d − k)ψ′(FII(t))F ′II(t)
ψ′(ψ−1(kψ(FI(t))+ (d − k)ψ(FII(t))))
= Σ′I(t)−
(k− 1)ψ′(FI(t))F ′I(t)+ (d − k)ψ′(FII(t))F ′II(t)
ψ′
(
ψ−1
(
k
d − 1ψ(ΣI(t))+
d − k
d − 1ψ(ΣII(t))
))
= Σ′I(t)−
ψ′(ΣI(t))Σ′I(t)
ψ′
(
ψ−1
(
k
d − 1ψ(ΣI(t))+
d − k
d − 1ψ(ΣII(t))
)) 
In a similar way, obtain
G′II(t)= Σ′II(t)−
ψ′(ΣII(t))Σ′II(t)
ψ′
(
ψ−1
(
k
d − 1ψ(ΣI(t))+
d − k
d − 1ψ(ΣII(t))
)) 
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Thus, the system of differential equations for identifying ΣI and ΣII is
Σ′I =
G′I
1− ψ
′(ΣI)
ψ′
(
ψ−1
(
k
d − 1ψ(ΣI)+
d − k
d − 1ψ(ΣII)
)) 
(A.22)
Σ′II =
G′II
1− ψ
′(ΣII)
ψ′
(
ψ−1
(
k
d − 1ψ(ΣI)+
d − k
d − 1ψ(ΣII)
)) 
This system is analyzed together with initial conditions
ΣI(t0)= ΣII(t0)= 0 (A.23)
It is enough to show that problem (A.22)–(A.23) cannot have more than one solution
in a neighborhood of t0 and, thus, cannot have more than one solution on the whole
support. This will also imply that FI and FII are identified because FI and FII are uniquely
determined by ΣI and ΣII as
FI =ψ−1
(
d − k
d − 1ψ(ΣII)−
d − k− 1
d − 1 ψ(ΣI)
)

FII =ψ−1
(
k
d − 1ψ(ΣI)−
k− 1
d − 1ψ(ΣII)
)

System (A.22) implies that for any point from the support,
kΣI + (d − k)ΣII − (d − 1)ψ−1
(
k
d − 1ψ(ΣI)+
d − k
d − 1ψ(ΣII)
)
= kGI + (d − k)GII
Suppose that problem (A.22)–(A.23) has two solutions (ΣIΣII) and (Σ˜I Σ˜II) with a com-
mon interval of existence [t0 t0 + c]. Let us show that for any t ∈ [t0 t0 + c], ΣI(t)≥ Σ˜I(t)
if and only if ΣII(t)≤ Σ˜II(t). Fix t ∈ (t0 t0 + c]. From the equation
kΣI + (d − k)ΣII − (d − 1)ψ−1
(
k
d − 1ψ(ΣI)+
d − k
d − 1ψ(ΣII)
)
= kΣ˜I + (d − k)Σ˜II − (d − 1)ψ−1
(
k
d − 1ψ(Σ˜I)+
d − k
d − 1ψ(Σ˜II)
)

obtain that
k
(
1− ψ
′(Σ∗I )
ψ′
(
ψ−1
(
k
d − 1ψ(Σ
∗
I )+
d − k
d − 1ψ(ΣII)
)))(ΣI − Σ˜I)
(A.24)
= (d − k)
(
1− ψ
′(Σ∗II)
ψ′
(
ψ−1
(
k
d − 1ψ(Σ˜I)+
d − k
d − 1ψ(Σ
∗
II)
)))(Σ˜II −ΣII)
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where Σ∗I = αΣI + (1 − α)Σ˜I for some α = α(ΣI(t) Σ˜I(t)ΣII(t)) ∈ [01] and Σ∗II = βΣII +
(1−β)Σ˜II for some β= β(Σ˜I(t)ΣII(t) Σ˜II(t)) ∈ [01]. Note that for t < T ,
ψ′(ΣI)
ψ′
(
ψ−1
(
k
d − 1ψ(ΣI)+
d − k
d − 1ψ(ΣII)
)) < 1
ψ′(Σ˜I)
ψ′
(
ψ−1
(
k
d − 1ψ(Σ˜I)+
d − k
d − 1ψ(Σ˜II)
)) < 1
Because Σ˜I
ΣI
→ 1, Σ˜II
ΣII
→ 1 as t ↓ t0, then for t close enough to t0 (c is chosen to be small
enough),
ψ′(Σ∗I )
ψ′
(
ψ−1
(
k
d − 1ψ(Σ
∗
I )+
d − k
d − 1ψ(ΣII)
)) < 1
ψ′(Σ∗II)
ψ′
(
ψ−1
(
k
d − 1ψ(Σ˜I)+
d − k
d − 1ψ(Σ
∗
II)
)) < 1
Therefore, (A.24) gives that ΣI(t) ≥ Σ˜I(t) if and only if ΣII(t) ≤ Σ˜II(t). The next step is to
show that this fact and the fact that the function ψ
′′(x)
(ψ′(x))2 is increasing imply that(
Σ′I − Σ˜′I
)
(ΣI − Σ˜I)≤ 0
(
Σ′II − Σ˜′II
)
(ΣII − Σ˜II)≤ 0 a.e. [t0 t0 + c]
Suppose that for a given point t ∈ (t0 t0 + c], at which the derivatives Σ′I and Σ˜′I exist, it
holds that ΣI ≥ Σ˜I. Let us prove that Σ′I − Σ˜′I ≤ 0. From (A.22), obtain that
Σ′I − Σ˜′I =
G′I
WI
(
ψ′(ΣI)
ψ′
(
ψ−1
(
k
d − 1ψ(ΣI)+
d − k
d − 1ψ(ΣII)
))
− ψ
′(Σ˜I)
ψ′
(
ψ−1
(
k
d − 1ψ(Σ˜I)+
d − k
d − 1ψ(Σ˜II)
)))
where
WI =
(
1− ψ
′(ΣI)
ψ′
(
ψ−1
(
k
d − 1ψ(ΣI)+
d − k
d − 1ψ(ΣII)
)))
×
(
1− ψ
′(Σ˜I)
ψ′
(
ψ−1
(
k
d − 1ψ(Σ˜I)+
d − k
d − 1ψ(Σ˜II)
)))
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Because ΣII ≤ Σ˜II, then
Σ′I − Σ˜′I ≤
gI
WI
(
ψ′(ΣI)
ψ′
(
ψ−1
(
k
d − 1ψ(ΣI)+
d − k
d − 1ψ(Σ˜II)
))
− ψ
′(Σ˜I)
ψ′
(
ψ−1
(
k
d − 1ψ(Σ˜I)+
d − k
d − 1ψ(Σ˜II)
)))
Now we want to show that the difference in the parentheses is nonpositive.
Because ψ′(Σ˜I)/(ψ′(ψ−1( kd−1ψ(Σ˜I)+ d−kd−1ψ(Σ˜II)))) < 1, then Σ˜I > ψ−1( kd−1ψ(Σ˜I) +
d−k
d−1ψ(Σ˜II)) and, therefore, ΣI > ψ
−1( kd−1ψ(Σ˜I) + d−kd−1ψ(Σ˜II)). Thus, if we show that the
function
ψ′(y1)
ψ′
(
ψ−1
(
k
d − 1ψ(y1)+
d − k
d − 1ψ(y2)
))
is decreasing in y1 when y1 and y2 are close to 0 and y1 > ψ−1( kd−1ψ(y1) + d−kd−1ψ(y2)),
then we will establish that Σ′I − Σ˜′I ≤ 0. The derivative of this function with respect to y1
is
ψ′′(y1)
ψ′
(
ψ−1
(
k
d − 1ψ(y1)+
d − k
d − 1ψ(y2)
))
−
k(ψ′(y1))2ψ′′
(
ψ−1
(
k
d − 1ψ(y1)+
d − k
d − 1ψ(y2)
))
(d − 1)
(
ψ′
(
ψ−1
(
k
d − 1ψ(y1)+
d − k
d − 1ψ(y2)
)))3 
For this derivative to be nonpositive, it is sufficient that
ψ′′(y1)
(ψ′(y1))2
≥
ψ′′
(
ψ−1
(
k
d − 1ψ(y1)+
d − k
d − 1ψ(y2)
))
(
ψ′
(
ψ−1
(
k
d − 1ψ(y1)+
d − k
d − 1ψ(y2)
)))2 
The last inequality holds because of the assumption that ψ
′′(x)
(ψ′(x))2 is increasing and the
condition y1 >ψ−1( kd−1ψ(y1)+ d−kd−1ψ(y2)).
To summarize, we have established that (Σ′I − Σ˜′IΣI − Σ˜I)≤ 0 a.e. on [t0 t0 + c], that
is,
d
dt
(ΣI − Σ˜I)2 ≤ 0 a.e. [t0 t0 + c]
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This inequality and (A.23) imply that ΣI and Σ˜I coincide in a neighborhood of t0. In a
similar way, it can be shown that
d
dt
(ΣII − Σ˜II)2 ≤ 0 a.e. [t0 t0 + c]
and, therefore, ΣII and Σ˜II coincide in a neighborhood of t0. 
A.7 Auctions with exogenous variation in the number of bidders
Similar to the main case, identification follows from several conditions on Gi, i= 123.
The conditions implied by the model are the following: (i) Gi(t0) = pi, i = 123; (ii) Gi
is absolutely continuous on [t0T ], i = 123; (iii) Gi is strictly increasing on [t0T ], i =
123. Depending on the values of pA, A ⊆ {123}, some additional restrictions on Gi
may be required.
An important part of proving identification is to demonstrate that under assumption
(3.9), each Fi, i = 123, has a unique representation through H. I consider two cases:
one with p123 > 0 and the other with p123 = 0.
Case p123 > 0 Rewrite functions Hi, i= 123, as
H1 = p123
(
F2 + p13
p123
)(
F3 + p12
p123
)
− p12p13
p123

H2 = p123
(
F1 + p23
p123
)(
F3 + p12
p123
)
− p12p23
p123

H3 = p123
(
F1 + p23
p123
)(
F2 + p13
p123
)
− p13p23
p123

Taking into account that Fi are positive for t > t0, derive the formulas
F1 = − p23
p123
+ 1
p123
√
(p123H2 +p12p23)(p123H3 +p13p23)
p123H1 +p12p13 
F2 = − p13
p123
+ 1
p123
√
(p123H1 +p12p13)(p123H3 +p13p23)
p123H2 +p12p23 
F3 = − p12
p123
+ 1
p123
√
(p123H1 +p12p13)(p123H2 +p12p23)
p123H3 +p13p23 
The expressions on the right-hand sides of these equations are q1(H), q2(H), and q3(H),
respectively. If all three values p12, p13, and p23 are strictly positive, it can shown that
conditions (i)–(iii) above are the only conditions required for identification. Otherwise,
the proof of uniqueness requires stronger conditions in the spirit of condition (III) in
Theorem 3.5. Notice that the situation of p12 = p13 = p23 = 0 is almost identical to the
paper’s main case.
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Case p123 = 0 Assumption 3.9 implies that p12 > 0, p13 > 0, p23 > 0. Because
H1 = p12F2 +p13F3
H2 = p12F1 +p23F3
H3 = p13F1 +p23F2
Fi are expressed through Hi as
F1 = − p232p13p12H1 +
1
2p12
H2 + 12p13H3
F2 = 12p12H1 −
p13
2p12p23
H2 + 12p23H3
F3 = 12p13H1 +
1
2p23
H2 − p122p13p23H3
The expressions on the right-hand sides of these equations are q1(H), q2(H), and q3(H),
respectively. It is easy to show that conditions (i)–(iii) above are sufficient to guarantee
identification. As we can see, in both cases Fi are uniquely expressed in terms of Hi.
Appendix B: Identification in generalized competing risks models
First, I outline Meilijson’s approach. From (4.3), Meilijson obtains a system of integral
equations that do not contain the derivatives of Fj ,
F(t)= exp
{
T˜ log
∫ t
t0
exp
{−M¯ log(1− F(s))dG(s)}}
where matrix M¯ is such that M¯(i j)= 1−M(i j) and T˜ = (M trM)−1Mtr. He suggests ap-
plying to these equations a fixed point theorem for multidimensional functional spaces.
As I mentioned, however, his proofs miss important parts.
I now turn to describing my method. The rank condition implies that m≥ d, that is,
there are at least as many minimal fatal sets as the number of the elements in a coherent
system. First, I consider the case of m = d and assume that the rank condition for the
incidence matrix M holds, that is, M is invertible. Introduce auxiliary functions
Hi =
∏
j∈Ii
Fj i= 1     d
and denote H = (H1    Hd)tr. The rank condition guarantees that functions Fi, i =
1     d, taking into account that they are positive, are uniquely expressed through func-
tions Hi, i= 1     d, via multiplication, division, and taking a rational root. Indeed,
logHi =
∑
j∈Ii
logFj i= 1     d
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These equations can be rewritten as logH =M logF ; therefore, F = exp{M−1 logH}, that
is,
Fi =
d∏
j=1
H
kij
j  i= 1     d (B.1)
Similar to the auction problem, I obtain an auxiliary system of differential equations by
rewriting (4.3) in terms of H:
H ′i =
gi∏
j∈Ici
(
1−
d∏
l=1
H
kjl
l
)  i= 1     d (B.2)
Functions Hi satisfy initial conditions
lim
t↓t0
Hi(t)= 0 i= 1     d (B.3)
As with the auction, the existence and uniqueness theorems, Theorems 4.1 and 4.2,
can be proved in steps. First, the results are obtained locally and then globally.
The existence of a local solution to (4.3)–(4.4) can be proved in the following way.
First, to avoid discontinuities in H, I can modify the auxiliary system (B.2) by intro-
ducing a very small number ε when necessary. Using Tonelli approximations, I can
establish the existence of a local solution for the auxiliary system with ε. After that,
I can take the limit as ε → 0 and show the existence of a local solution for (B.2)–(B.3).
Then I can use formulas (B.1) to obtain the existence of a local solution to problem
(4.3)–(4.4). To establish local uniqueness, I obtain a generalized local Lipschitz condi-
tion on Hi.
Finally, I can show that the unique local solution can be extended to the whole sup-
port and that such an extension is unique. Again, the monotonicity of Fi in this solution
has to be assumed.
Below I prove the local uniqueness part of Theorem 4.2.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Let F and F˜ be two local solutions to (4.3)–(4.4) with a com-
mon interval of existence [t0 t0 + c]. Let H and H˜ be the corresponding auxiliary func-
tions. ThenH and H˜ solve auxiliary system (B.2) a.e. on (t0 t0+c]. Denote the right-hand
side of (B.2) as
J(tH)=
(
g1(t)∏
j∈Ic1
(
1−
d∏
l=1
H
kjl
l
)      gd(t)∏
j∈Icd
(
1−
d∏
l=1
H
kjl
l
))
The plan is to derive a generalized local Lipschitz condition on Hi and then use Lemmas
A.7 and A.8 to establish that H and H˜ coincide. This will imply that F and F˜ coincide.
Consider Hi − H˜i for any i and let |Ici | be the number of elements in Ici . Then, a.e. on
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[t0 t0 + c],∣∣H ′i − H˜ ′i∣∣ = gi∏
j∈Ici
(1− Fj)
− gi∏
j∈Ici
(1− F˜j)
= gi∏
j∈Ici
(1− Fj)
∏
j∈Ici
(1− F˜j)
(∏
j∈Ici
(1− Fj)−
∏
j∈Ici
(
1− Fj + (Fj − F˜j)
))
≤ gi∏
j∈Ici
(1− Fj)
∏
j∈Ici
(1− F˜j)
2|Ici |−1
∑
j∈Ici
|Fj − F˜j| ≤ Cigi
∑
j∈Ici
|Fj − F˜j|
for some constant Ci. Differences |Fj − F˜j| can be bounded from above by expressions
of |Hj − H˜j|. According to (B.1), for t > t0,
Fj − F˜j =
d∏
l=1
H
kjl
l −
d∏
l=1
H˜
kjl
l ;
therefore,
Fj − F˜j =
d∑
h=1
∏
l<h
H
kjl
l
∏
m>h
H˜
kjm
m
(
H
kjh
h − H˜
kjh
h
)

For x1x2 > 0, by the mean value theorem,
xαl − xα2 = α
(
θx1 + (1− θ)x2
)α−1
(x1 − x2)
where θ= θ(x1x2) ∈ [01]. If α≥ 1, then∣∣xαl − xα2 ∣∣≤ α(max{x1x2})α−1|x1 − x2|
If α< 1, then∣∣xαl − xα2 ∣∣≤ |α|(min{x1x2})α−1|x1 − x2|
Because Hh(t) H˜h(t) > 0 for t > t0, then for t > t0,∣∣Hkjhh (t)− H˜kjhh (t)∣∣≤Wjh(t)∣∣Hh(t)− H˜h(t)∣∣
where
Wjh(t)=
(
1(kjh ≥ 1)max
{
Hh(t) H˜h(t)
}+ 1(kjh < 1)min{Hh(t) H˜h(t)})kjh−1
Because limt↓t0
Hh(t)
Gh(t)
= 1 and limt↓t0 H˜h(t)Gh(t) = 1, then limt↓t0
Wjh(t)
G
kjh−1
h (t)
= 1. Hence, for t > t0,
|Fj − F˜j| ≤Lj
d∑
h=1
(∏
l =h
G
kjl
l
)
G
kjh−1
h |kjh||Hh − H˜h|
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for some constants Lj > 0. Thus, a.e. on [t0 t0 + c],
∣∣H ′i(t)− H˜ ′i(t)∣∣≤Digi∑
j∈Ici
d∑
h=1
(∏
l =h
G
kjl
l (t)
)
G
kjh−1
h (t)|kjh|
∣∣Hh(t)− H˜h(t)∣∣
for some constants Di > 0 and, consequently,∥∥H ′(t)− H˜ ′(t)∥∥1 ≤ C(Γ1(t)+ · · · + Γd(t))∥∥H(t)− H˜(t)∥∥1
for some constant C > 0. This inequality and Lemmas A.7 and A.8 imply that H(t) =
H˜(t), t ∈ [t0 t0 + c]. 
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